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Abstract
There is a wide spectrum of options for genetic resources exchange systems, ranging
from a strictly bilateral approach at one extreme, to an unstructured informal multilateral
approach at the other. Between these two extremes lie a host of additional options which
draw on elements from both ends of the spectrum.
In examining the extreme ends of the spectrum of options, the report points out that, at
least for food crop germplasm, exclusively bilateral arrangements are likely to be
excessively complicated given the large number of potential actors, the complex
pedigrees of crop lines, the limited capacity of many partners to be able to negotiate
favourable terms, and the relatively limited financial benefits that might accrue from such
arrangements
At the other end of the spectrum lies an approach which characterises the current informal
exchange system. This approach has been responsible for much of the food crop
germplasm collected and exchanged internationally over the past two decades and has
benefited both developing and developed countries. However, a lack of clarity
concerning the rights and obligations associated with participation in the system and its
conformity with the objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) relative to
benefit-sharing has left it open to charges of non-transparency and has tended to
discourage the involvement of some important stakeholders. Thus there appears to be a
need for a more formal approach, although one that retains the essential features of the
current system.
The report considers the possible structure of this more formal approach. It presents a
flexible multilateral framework – referred to as the Multilateral System for Exchange
(MUSE) – that would be governed by mutually agreed rules. MUSE is not an exchange
system per se; rather it is the framework for a system, which could accommodate the
broad range of options existing between the above-mentioned extremes of purely
bilateral arrangements and informal multilateral approaches to exchange. For example,
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MUSE could make provision for benefit-sharing on a bilateral basis under certain
circumstances. Under another scenario, MUSE might include a fund as a mechanism for
financial compensation in return for access and in recognition of the concept of Farmers’
Rights. A combination of these scenarios might coexist within the MUSE framework and
be applied according to circumstances. For instance, the scenario providing for bilateral
negotiations might apply in the case of non-food crops only.
The policy basis for the MUSE framework would be set by general principles established
in the CBD. The system would operate according to standard rules governing conditions
of membership, terms of access to genetic resources, mechanisms for sharing benefits
among participants, and relationships with non-members. The MUSE rules would
provide formal clarification – and protection – of the rights and obligations associated with
the exchange of PGR under the terms of the CBD and the revised International Undertaking.
If it is decided that the MUSE approach is worth pursuing further, a number of issues
need more detailed study, e.g. the transaction costs involved in the various options. In
the meantime, it is hoped that the IPGRI report will stimulate interest and contribute
positively to the on-going debate on systems for germplasm exchange.
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Foreword
Genetic diversity within and among plants, animals and microorganisms
provides the foundation for farming systems throughout the world. The
continued existence of much of this diversity is threatened, yet it remains a
fundamental resource that underpins our ability to tailor food production to
meet future challenges - whether new pests or diseases, changing climates or the
relentlessly increasing demands of an ever expanding human population. Our
collective ability to meet these challenges will depend on our capacity to access
and use a wide assortment of genes and genotypes. The failure to do so will
impact all of the peoples of the world, but in particular those living under the
most difficult conditions; often the very communities which have, over the
millennia, developed the genetic resources which are so vital to us today. If they,
in particular, are to gain from our efforts to identify and use genetic variability, it
is imperative that we find ways to promote further the equitable sharing of the
benefits derived from its use. This report, prepared at the request of the FAO
Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, aims to contribute
to the ongoing debate on how best to ensure that germplasm continues to be
available internationally in the best interests of all.
The report considers a range of options, from the current, essentially
unregulated system, through to a global germplasm exchange system based
solely on bilateral agreements. A framework, referred to as the Multilateral
System for Exchange (MUSE), is presented within which the many intermediate
options between these two extremes can be considered. The report explores
some of these options.
The report is based on the work of a Study Team which, during the course of its
investigations, held a wide series of consultations with many stakeholders and
interest groups. It operated under the guidance of a task force established by
IPGRI and which included FAO staff members as observers. The leader of the
Study Team was Mr. Wolfgang Siebeck who, sadly, passed away very shortly
after the report was finalized. His contribution to the report was enormous, as it
was to so many of the complex issues currently being addressed internationally
in relation to genetic resources. This report is dedicated to his memory.
In outlining a range of different options and setting a possible framework for
solutions, the report does not closely examine the transaction costs involved in
implementing the different options. It is clear however that further work is
needed in this area. IPGRI thus intends to further this aspect of the study over
the coming months with the aim of providing a supplementary analysis by the
time the report is considered by the Commission in December 1996.
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I trust that this report, together with the proposed supplement, will prove to be a
useful contribution to the debate in the FAO Commission regarding the revision
of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, as well as to the
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Summary
1. The 6th session of the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources
requested that IPGRI study the feasibility of possible systems for the
exchange of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA)1
and the equitable sharing of benefits. The following report is the result
of that study. It seeks to provide the Commission with a set of options
and their implications and thus to inform international negotiations
concerning the revision of the International Undertaking on Plant
Genetic Resources. As part of the study process a wide series of
consultations was held with major stakeholder groups.
 
2. A fundamental justification for conserving and characterizing PGRFA is
their potential for use in the development of improved crop varieties.
These improved varieties are necessary to meet the food needs of a
growing population and the demands of changing agro-ecological and
social conditions. Plant breeding for sustainable agriculture is
dependent on the existing diversity of PGRFA. Yet this diversity is
currently underused and furthermore, is threatened by genetic erosion.
 
3. Important food crops are usually widely distributed and may be major
staples in regions far from their origin. The dispersal and exchange of
crops have gone on since the early spread of agriculture. The reliance of
countries on introduced crops means that no country is self-sufficient in
plant genetic resources. Even though many nations harbour significant
genetic diversity in genebanks and on farmers’ fields, they will still
continue to require access to the diversity available elsewhere. The
interdependence of countries with regard to PGRFA clearly points to the
need for the international exchange of genetic resources and related
information.
 
4. Farmers and professional breeders have traditionally relied on open
access to genetic resources. In recent years, however, there has been a
trend towards greater privatization of plant breeding and research,
coupled with increasing pressures to enact stricter intellectual property
legislation. At the same time, there is a growing recognition of the
potential value of biodiversity to sustainable development. With the
entry into force of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the
                                                     
1 According to the International Undertaking, plant genetic resources encompass: “cultivated
varieties in current use and newly developed; obsolete cultivars; primitive varieties
(landraces); wild and weedy species; near relatives of cultivated varieties; and special genetic
stocks including elite and current breeder’s lines and mutants.” International Undertaking on
Plant Genetic Resources, Article 2 i (a).
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conservation imperative has received formal recognition, as have the
sovereign rights of nations to control access to their biological diversity
and to make it available under terms and conditions that are agreed
mutually between providers and recipients. Among other things, these
conditions permit providers of original material to negotiate a fair and
equitable share of the benefits arising from its exploitation.
 
5. The Global Plan of Action (GPA), which will be one of the principal
outputs of the upcoming FAO International Technical Conference on Plant
Genetic Resources, will serve as an important tool for implementing the
revised International Undertaking, and indeed the CBD itself, with regard
to PGRFA. The effectiveness of the GPA will depend on strengthening
international cooperation and ensuring continued access by all countries
to the full range of crop genetic diversity.
 
6. International cooperation in the field of PGRFA can provide significant
benefits including:
• increased opportunities for developing joint conservation and use
strategies and for sharing responsibilities and costs regionally and/or
globally, including the provision of mechanisms for safety
duplication;
• the facilitation of research partnerships and the pooling of research
resources needed to exploit particular genepools effectively;
• access to greater amounts of germplasm than are available in any one
country;
• access to improved materials;
• access to relevant technologies developed by partner countries;
• a greater exposure of material to a wide range of environments,
thereby leading to better understanding of its properties and hence,
better exploitation of its potential;
• access by providers to information, e.g. special traits or multilocation
testing data, on material that they have supplied as well as on
material supplied by partners;
• more cost-effective means of exchanging information, e.g. through
shared databases and information systems;
• access to training at a range of specialized institutions.
 
7. In devising mechanisms for implementing the GPA, the revised
International Undertaking and the CBD, it is important to consider the
suitability of the two basic approaches to the exchange of genetic
resources under given circumstances. Bilateral approaches are typically
partnerships of two institutions or governments, generally formalized
through a contract or memorandum of understanding. Multilateral
approaches involve a number of countries and/or institutions that agree
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collectively to terms and conditions for sharing materials and benefits.
Both approaches have advantages and are consistent with the CBD.
 
8. Bilateral approaches may be most appropriate when a small number of
countries have, or need access to, the genetic diversity of a particular
species or group of species, and/or when highly expensive and
specialized research gives a strong competitive advantage to a single or
limited number of institutions. Such conditions may prevail in the case
of some industrial crops and in certain sectors, for example
pharmaceuticals.
 
9. Multilateral approaches may be most appropriate in situations where
individual countries harbour only part of the genetic variability (i.e. the
total genepool) of interest, and/or when farmers and professional
breeders in many countries need access to particular resources. They are
also appropriate when there is a high social stake in successful crop
improvement and when the pooled efforts of many are likely to be more
effective in promoting improvement than the efforts of a few. These
conditions prevail for the majority of staple food crops.
 
10. The report examines three options for exchange systems:
• a strictly bilateral approach
• the current informal multilateral approach
• a multilateral framework governed by mutually agreed rules.
 
11. Exclusively bilateral arrangements have rarely been reported in the case
of staple food crops but are likely to be extremely complicated given the
large number of potential actors (and hence individual agreements)
involved, the complex pedigrees of crop lines (and hence the difficulty
of assessing and apportioning benefits), the limited capacity of many
partners to be able to negotiate favourable terms, and the relatively
limited financial benefits that might accrue from such arrangements. The
report concludes that a strictly bilateral approach to the exchange of
food crop germplasm is likely to be excessively cumbersome and thus
does not consider this option at length.
 
12. The second option represents the current approach to exchange, an
informal system which comprises national programmes and other
partners, including CGIAR Centres, NGOs and the private sector. This
approach is both flexible and cost-effective. It has been responsible for
much of the food crop germplasm collected and exchanged
internationally over the past two decades and has benefited both
developing and developed countries. However, a lack of clarity
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concerning the rights and obligations associated with participation in
the system has left it open to charges of non-transparency and has
tended to discourage the involvement of some important stakeholders,
in particular, the informal sector. Thus there appears to be a need for a
more formal approach, although one that retains the essential features of
the current system.
 
13. The third broad option – referred to as MUSE2 – describes such an
approach: a flexible multilateral framework governed by mutually
agreed rules. The CBD would set the context for MUSE and would
provide the guiding principles for the system. The MUSE rules would
provide formal clarification – and protection – of the rights and
obligations associated with the exchange of PGR under the terms of the
CBD and the revised International Undertaking.
 
14. The basic MUSE framework as described would retain the strengths of
the current multilateral approach but would add to its transparency by
clearly specifying the rights and obligations of all members. Such a
framework could accommodate the broad range of alternatives existing
between the above-mentioned extremes of purely bilateral arrangements
and informal multilateral approaches to exchange. For example, MUSE
could make provision for benefit-sharing on a bilateral basis under
certain circumstances, typically upon commercialization. Another
scenario might include a fund as a mechanism for financial
compensation in return for access and in recognition of the concept of
Farmers’ Rights. A combination of these scenarios might coexist within
the MUSE framework and be applied according to circumstances. For
instance, the scenario providing for bilateral negotiations might apply in
the case of non-food crops only.
 
15. Membership in MUSE would be voluntary and would be open to all
stakeholders with an interest in PGRFA. These include farming and
indigenous communities, government departments and institutions,
genebanks, managers of protected areas, university departments, private
charitable institutions, commercial institutions and companies, regional
and international research institutions, inter-governmental
organizations, non-governmental organizations, etc.
 
16. Countries wishing join MUSE would become party to an agreement. The
FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture might
consider negotiating such an agreement within the framework or as part
of the revised International Undertaking. In accepting the MUSE
                                                     
2 A MUltilateral System for Exchange.
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Agreement, members would agree to collaborate and to operate
according to standard rules governing conditions of membership, terms
of access to genetic resources, mechanisms for sharing benefits among
participants, and relationships with non-members. The subsequent
governance and monitoring of MUSE, including responsibility for
revising the MUSE rules to meet changing needs, would rest with
government members.
 
17. Conditions for non-government membership (private institutions,
NGOs, farming and indigenous communities, etc.) would be set by the
host country of the participating institute or organization whose
responsibility it would be to determine how to implement and enforce
these conditions at the national level. Governments might, for example,
allow interested parties to join MUSE by entering into an agreement at
the national level or with the system as a whole. The latter option might
apply for institutes and organizations located in non-member countries
or for international organizations such as the CGIAR. Once they have
joined MUSE, non-government members would be bound by the same
basic rules regulating access and benefit-sharing as are contained in the
MUSE Agreement.
 
18. A system such as MUSE is likely to attract greater participation from the
“informal sector” (non-governmental organizations, farmer and
community groups, etc.) in mainstream genetic resources efforts than is
currently the case. The MUSE rules would apply to all members and, to
the extent that infringements could be detected, would be enforceable.
All members would be free to pursue their own objectives as long as
these were consistent with the rules of the system. At the operational
level, MUSE would be characterized by a rich diversity of permanent
and temporary alliances, implemented by a mixture of existing networks
and new partnerships.
 
19. Because current arrangements for the exchange of genetic resources are
not standardized (a notable exception being the standard agreements
that accompany the release of materials from CGIAR genebanks), they
tend to be made on a case-by-case basis. The adoption of standard terms
and conditions under MUSE could greatly reduce – or avoid altogether –
the necessity to conclude individual agreements for each transaction
conducted between participants and could substantially reduce
bureaucracy and transaction costs overall.
 
20. In addition to encouraging broader participation and increasing the
transparency and cost-efficiency of international conservation efforts,
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membership in MUSE would offer a wide range of benefits. It should be
noted that these are not uniquely available under MUSE. Indeed, any
form of international cooperation has the potential to provide such
benefits, as noted above. The principal advantage of MUSE is that it
would contain mutually agreed mechanisms for ensuring that these
benefits are shared equitably among participants and for protecting the
rights and enforcing the obligations of all.
 
21. The MUSE Agreement would define such areas as:
• the scope of the system in terms of genetic resources
• the terms under which access would be provided
• mechanisms for sharing benefits
• membership terms and conditions
• governance and decision-making mechanisms
• rules of membership and mechanisms for monitoring and
enforcement
• mechanisms for interacting with non-members.
 
22. The report identifies a number of criteria that might be used to define
the range of genetic resources that would be made available through
MUSE (the “scope” of the system). Criteria for defining scope might
include, among others: categories of plant genetic resources;
conservation location (e.g. in situ or ex situ); intended use of the
materials (e.g. whether they are to be used in crop improvement or for
pharmaceutical purposes); whether the materials were collected before
or after the entry into force of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
The report notes that, at a minimum, MUSE should include all major
staple food crops. Coverage might be on an inclusive basis (whereby a
list would specify materials included in the scope) or an exclusive basis
(whereby a list would specify what is not included).
 
23. In considering scenarios within the MUSE option, the report discusses
the possibility of establishing a fund as a mechanism for financial
compensation in return for access. This could be one of the mechanisms
for recognizing Farmers' Rights. If a fund were to be included in MUSE,
decisions would be needed on such matters as its establishment,
governance, replenishment and disbursement. Special consideration
would need to be given to developing mechanisms and guidelines for
allocating the funds, and in particular, for ensuring that farmers and
local communities receive adequate compensation. The fund issue is
currently under discussion in other fora and therefore is not covered at
length in the report.
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24. Another scenario within MUSE might allow, under certain
circumstances (typically when there are prospects for
commercialization), an original provider of germplasm to enter into
bilateral negotiations with a recipient for an appropriate share of
benefits. This might be in the form of access to a commercialized
product derived from the germplasm, or to technologies, royalty-free or
on special terms; access to facilities, training or other services; or an
appropriate share of royalties or profits arising from the product. The
questions of when to enter into such negotiations and how to define
“commercialization” are examined in Annex IV.
 
25. It is noted that in the case of commercialization of the seed of crop
varieties included within the agreed scope of MUSE, profit-sharing
arrangements are likely to give rise to relatively small revenues. In many
cases, these could easily be consumed by the administrative and legal
costs involved in negotiating benefit-sharing. However, if both
providers and recipients of germplasm within MUSE determine that
there are sufficient grounds to warrant bilateral negotiations, these could
be carried out under standard, multilaterally agreed guidelines – thus
significantly lowering costs – and possibly with legal assistance
provided through the system. Options for allowing bilateral benefit-
sharing within MUSE are examined in Annex IV.
 
26. In many countries, the signing of the Agreement would enable the
MUSE terms to be enforced in that nation. In other cases, special legal
arrangements would have to be made in order to be able to enforce the
terms of the Agreement. These might take various forms, such as broad
umbrella agreements, mechanisms for registering institutions with
MUSE, or specific material transfer agreements (MTAs)3 governing
individual exchanges. Options for addressing this and related
institutional issues are examined in an annex to the report.
 
27. By signing the MUSE Agreement, governments would agree in advance
to standard terms of prior informed consent (PIC) and would operate on
the basis of standard, mutually agreed terms (MAT) with respect to the
exchange of all material included in the scope of the system. The PIC
and rights of local communities and of other non-government holders of
genetic resources would be established through instruments
determining their participation in or relationship to MUSE, and in
                                                     
3 An MTA is a legally binding agreement between two or more parties that specifies the terms and
conditions under which materials will be supplied and specifies the obligations of the
recipient. The jurisdiction under which the MTA is governed, normally that of the recipient
country, is specified in the agreement
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accordance with national policy and legislation. Such instruments might
in turn contain provisions for recognizing Farmers’ Rights.
 
28. MUSE would facilitate access by all members to the materials within its
scope. The collective benefits of participating in the system would also
be available to all members. However special arrangements might be
needed to ensure that communities and farmers providing germplasm
to MUSE know where their materials are being held and how they, and
other genetic resources, can be accessed. Any group or institution
providing material to MUSE – whether or not they are formal
participants in the system – would retain the right to have continued
and unrestricted access to that material.
 
29. Genetic resources included in the system might be released to non-
members only under certain arrangements. This would typically be
through standard MTAs negotiated and agreed by all MUSE members.
The conditions under which materials would be made available to non-
members might be identical to the terms of access by members, or might
place added obligations on recipients, such as the requirement to
provide materials to the system in exchange, special requirements for
the sharing of information, or a requirement to make research products
available to members (or to a subgroup of members such as developing
countries) on concessional terms.
 
30. A small secretariat would be required to ensure the effective
management of MUSE. An information unit would also be needed to
serve the needs of MUSE members. In addition, consideration could be
given to establishing a service unit to help co-ordinate and facilitate
various aspects of benefit-sharing, including the transfer of technology,
and funding provided by donor agencies and others for specific projects
and activities to be conducted within the framework of MUSE.
Membership fees might be levied to cover the operational costs of
running MUSE, including the secretariat and the information and
service units.
 
31. If it is decided that the basic MUSE option or any of its scenarios are
worth pursuing further, a number of questions need more detailed
study, including the likely costs of the system, as well as various issues
related to benefit-sharing, governance and implications of the system for
national legislation.
 
32. The future development of agricultural systems world-wide requires
that PGRFA remain accessible, are available under terms and conditions
designed to ensure conservation and continued sustainable use, and that
ACCESS TO PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES – THE MUSE STUDY 11
INTERNATIONAL PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES INSTITUTE
the benefits arising from that use are shared equitably. It is hoped that
the options considered in this report will stimulate interest and
contribute positively to the ongoing debate on these issues.
12 ISSUES IN GENETIC RESOURCES NO. 4
INTERNATIONAL PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES INSTITUTE
 Organization of the Paper
Part I of the paper sets the broad context for the study and outlines a
number of approaches to the exchange of genetic resources. Chapter I
provides the background to the study and Chapter II reviews alternative
exchange models, the uses and relevance of these options in specific
situations, and their respective costs and benefits. The Multilateral
System for Exchange (MUSE), a multilateral framework guided by a set
of mutually agreed regulations, is introduced in this chapter.
Part II of the paper examines the MUSE option, and possible scenarios,
in more detail. Chapter III describes the institutional framework and the
benefits associated with participation in the system. The possible scope
of the system is addressed in Chapter IV. Chapter V presents
conclusions and recommendations for future action. A more detailed
analysis of possible mechanisms for implementing aspects of MUSE is
given in Annex IV.
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 Part I.  Introduction, Context and Options
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 Chapter I.  Introduction
 Origin of the Study
1. At its Sixth Session in June 1994, the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic
Resources invited Dr. Geoffrey Hawtin, Director-General of IPGRI4, to
outline the technical and policy problems inherent in managing the
plant genetic resources5 collections held in trust by the CGIAR Centres.6
These collections form part of the FAO Network of Ex Situ Collections.7
In the course of his presentation, Dr. Hawtin described a possible
approach to facilitating access to plant genetic resources and promoting
the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their use. The
Commission requested Dr. Hawtin to prepare a note based on his
intervention (see Annex I).
 
2. The Commission is currently considering the revision of the FAO
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources to bring it in line
with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).8 Members felt that
the approach proposed by Dr. Hawtin for the exchange of germplasm
                                                     
4The International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, one of the 16 international agricultural
research institutes of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).
5 According to the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, plant genetic resources
encompass: “cultivated varieties in current use and newly developed; obsolete cultivars;
primitive varieties (landraces); wild and weedy species; near relatives of cultivated varieties;
and special genetic stocks including elite and current breeder’s lines and mutants”.
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Article 2 i (a).
6 Established in 1971, the CGIAR is an association of countries, international and regional
organizations, and private foundations dedicated to supporting a system of agricultural
research centres and programmes around the world. Sixteen centres are currently sponsored
by the Group.
7 In 1983, FAO established an International Network of Ex Situ Collections as an integral part of
the Global System for the Conservation and Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources. The
objectives of the network are to ensure safe conservation and promote unrestricted availability
and sustainable use of plant genetic resources, by providing a framework for sharing of
benefits and burdens. Several countries have indicated their interest in joining the Network.
      In October 1994, the FAO signed agreements with 12 of the Centres of the CGIAR, in which the
Centres agreed to continue to hold designated germplasm in trust and to make it available for
research, not to file for intellectual property protection on the material and related information,
and to ensure that any recipient of the material must assume the same responsibility. The
agreements only cover collections assembled prior to the entry into force of the Convention on
Biological Diversity.
8 The International Undertaking, adopted in 1983, is a non-binding set of rules that promotes
international conservation efforts aimed to stem the rapid erosion of the genetic diversity of
crop plants. Resolution 8/83 of the Twenty-second Session of the FAO Conference. Rome, 5-23
November 1983.
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could contribute to the Commission’s deliberations on the Undertaking
and therefore requested IPGRI to prepare "an in-depth study, for the
consideration of the Commission, of various possible systems which
would be compatible with the Convention on Biological Diversity,
analyzed in terms of their likely efficiency, practicality and cost-
effectiveness."
 
3. IPGRI appointed a Study Team to assist in carrying out the in-depth
study. The work was supervised by a Task Force composed of senior
IPGRI staff and two observers from FAO. The Study Team included
experts in the conservation and exchange of plant genetic resources, the
CGIAR system, the CBD and law (see Annex II for the terms of reference
and composition of the Study Team and Task Force). During the course
of the study, the Team consulted with governments, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector in several fora, including the
Second Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological




 Objective of the Report
4. This report seeks to provide the Commission on Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture9 with a set of options and their implications, to
inform negotiations concerning the revision of the International
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources.
                                                     
9 By Resolution 3/95 of the Twenty-eighth Session of the FAO Conference, the Commission on
Plant Genetic Resources became the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture.
16 ISSUES IN GENETIC RESOURCES NO. 4
INTERNATIONAL PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES INSTITUTE
 Interdependence and the History of Exchange of PGRFA
5. Throughout history, crops have traveled beyond national borders,
carried abroad by ecological and social interactions, shifting populations
and explorers. As a result, both developed and developing countries rely
on introduced crops for a large part of their production and
consumption. In many countries, crops originating in other parts of the
world have become a national dietary staple and a major export. For
example, North America is almost completely dependent on species
originally domesticated in other regions for its food and industrial crops.
Sub-Saharan Africa depends on species domesticated elsewhere for 87%
of its crops. It is estimated that 69% of developing countries acquire
more than half of their crop production from crops domesticated in
other regions.10 Even countries that are particularly rich in biological
diversity still rely heavily on crops and hence, to a considerable extent,
genetic resources, originating in other parts of the world. In Brazil, for
example, nearly half the population’s energy from plant sources comes
from the three major cereals – rice, wheat and maize – all of which
originated in other parts of the world.11
 
 Percentage of total regional food production based on crops originating in other
regions of diversity12
 Region % of Production accounted for by
 non-native crops
 West Central Asia   31
 Indochina   34
 Hindustan   49
 Latin America   56
 Chino-Japan   62
 Africa   88
 Euro-Siberia   91
 Mediterranean   99
 Australia100
 North America 100
 
6. The reliance of countries on introduced crops means that no country is
self-sufficient in genetic resources. While many countries hold large
amounts of plant genetic diversity in genebanks and on farmers’ fields,
                                                     
10 Wood, D. 1988a. Crop Germplasm: Common Heritage or Farmers’ Heritage? In Seeds and
Sovereignty (J.R. Kloppenburg, Jr., ed.). Duke University Press.
Wood, D. 1988b. Introduced Crops in Developing Countries -- a Sustainable Agriculture? Food
Policy 167-177 (May 1988).
11 Cooper, D., Engels, J., and Frison, E. 1994. A Multilateral System for Plant Genetic Resources:
Imperatives, Achievements and Challenges. Issues in Plant Genetic Resources No. 2, May 1994.
International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, Rome, Italy.
12 Cooper et al., 1994.
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they will continue to require access to the diversity available elsewhere
for genes with useful traits for crop improvement and to guard against
the risks of over-reliance on too narrow a genetic base. The
interdependence of countries with regard to genetic resources highlights
the need for the international exchange of germplasm and related
information.
 
7. To date, most plant genetic resources have changed hands informally
among breeders and researchers. Formal contracts such as material
transfer agreements (MTAs)13 are a more recent phenomenon and are
still relatively rare. They are usually signed when genetic material is
exchanged as part of a collaborative research programme. Protected
varieties are, in general, freely available under PVP legislation for use in
further breeding and research.14 In some countries, varieties and other
genetic material can be protected by utility patents.
 
8. Governments have hitherto exercised little or no control over the
exchange of genetic resources of major food crops. Countries have
generally permitted collecting missions on the condition that their own
scientists participate and that samples of collected material (and related
information) are provided for storage at a local facility. The practice of
free exchange is apparently still observed by many genebanks in
industrialized and developing countries. As recently as 1990, for
example, the US Congress voted into law a provision according to which
genetic material assembled by its National Genetic Resources
Programme is freely available to any country upon request.15
 
9. The genetic resources collections housed in the genebanks of the CGIAR
have been assembled with the participation of the countries providing
the material, on the understanding that it will be made available to the
research community world-wide. For this reason, and because the use of
                                                     
13 An MTA is a legally binding agreement between two or more parties that specifies the terms
and conditions under which materials will be supplied and specifies the obligations of the
recipient. The jurisdiction under which the MTA is governed, normally that of the recipient
country, is specified in the agreement.
14 However, the concept of “essential derivation” introduced in the 1991 revision of the UPOV
Convention invokes the principle of compensation to the owner of the original variety when
the genome of a derived variety is characterized by relatively few genetic changes, typically the
substitution of a single gene.
15 Sec. 1632(a)(4) of Public Law 101-624 of November 28, 1990 reads: "The Secretary [of
Agriculture], ...shall (4) make available upon request, without charge and without regard to the
country from which such request originates, the genetic material which the program
assembles."
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plant genetic resources is central to their crop improvement
programmes, the Centres have followed a policy of allowing
unrestricted access to the plant genetic resources in their collections.16
10. The current informal exchange ‘system’ comprises national programmes
and other partners, including CGIAR Centres, NGOs and the private
sector. It provides a good example of a multilateral approach to the
conservation and use of genetic resources. This system has been
responsible for much of the food crop germplasm collected and
exchanged internationally over the past two decades.
 The CGIAR
11. The CGIAR Centres play a key role in the conservation and use of
livestock, fish and plant genetic resources, including forestry and
agroforestry species. Over the past three decades, the Centres have
collectively assembled what is believed to be the world’s largest
international ex situ collection of the genetic resources of food and
fodder crops of importance to developing countries. These comprise
some 500 000 accessions, including wild species, landraces, improved
varieties and genetic stocks, housed in modern genebank facilities. The
majority of the materials from the collections are duplicated at national,
regional and other international research institutes. The Centres will
continue to expand their in-trust collections with the aim of conserving
the major diversity of the genepools concerned, either by increasing the
holdings at the Centres themselves, or through collaborative
arrangements with other genebanks.
 
12. The CGIAR Centres promote and facilitate the exchange of landraces,
promising varieties and elite breeding lines with national agricultural
research systems (NARS) and other partners for their evaluation and use in
different ecosystems. Each year, nearly 150 000 germplasm accessions
from the in-trust collections and 500 000 samples of improved material
are distributed by the Centres, the large majority going to developing
countries. Like the genetic resources themselves, all related information is
available without restriction.
 
13. The CGIAR promotes the development of sustainable agricultural systems
through research and assistance to national programmes. Many of the
Centres assist NARS to develop their own programmes for the
conservation and use of plant genetic resources through joint collecting,
                                                     
16 TAC Document GAR/TAC/88/4 "CGIAR Policy on Plant Genetic Resources", Rome, February
1988.
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evaluation, repatriation of materials, regeneration of accessions and storage
of duplicates of NARS collections.
 
14. A primary objective of the CGIAR is to develop new products and
technologies, including biotechnologies, and to make them, and related
information, available without restriction to developing countries. Training
is a key component of the CGIAR’s activities. Since 1971, the Centres have
trained approximately 30 000 developing-country scientists and technicians
in genetic resources conservation and use and related topics.
 
 
 The Users of PGRFA
15. From the dawn of agriculture, farmers and indigenous communities have
selected suitable plants from genetically diverse populations and have
propagated them by seed or other forms of planting material. Plant
breeding covers a range of activities, from relatively simple selection to the
use of sophisticated techniques such as genetic engineering. The skill of the
breeder lies, for the most part, in choosing the parents and in selecting the
desired recombinants from a large population of material.
 
16. The overriding justification for collecting, conserving and evaluating
PGRFA is to ensure their availability for use in the development of
improved crop varieties. The most obvious use of plant genetic
resources involves the introduction of desired characteristics into
existing crops. However, this first entails extensive screening to discover
the particular traits of interest, a process which requires the “use” of
many thousands of genebank accessions.17 In the long term, breeding
programmes would be at risk if they lacked sufficient genetic variation
to respond to changing situations, e.g. new diseases or variants of
pathogens or other changing ecological factors.
                                                     
17 The importance of ensuring that the full range of genetic diversity is available in genebanks is
illustrated by the following typical example from IRRI.  In the search for accessions with
resistance to whitebacked planthopper, 48 554 accessions of O. sativa were tested from which
401 were selected as resistant and 437 accessions of wild rice were tested from which 202 were
selected as resistant. [Chang. T.T., 1989. The Case for Large Collections. In The Use of Plant
Genetic Resources (A.H.D. Brown, O.H. Frankel, D.R. Marshall and J.T. Williams, eds.).
Cambridge University Press.]
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 Plant Breeding
17. Modern plant breeding involves crossing parents with complementary
characteristics to generate a population of genetically recombined
plants, a small proportion of which, it is hoped, will provide the
particular assemblage of genes required. In a modern variety, genes
from a very large number of parents, from many different countries or
regions, may be combined (see VEERY figure, page 24).
18. In the early stages of breeding, scientists may screen thousands of
germplasm samples in search of useful new traits. Using this material,
crosses are made giving rise to thousands of different gene
combinations. These are narrowed down by selection, generally of
individual plants or lines, over several generations. The overwhelming
majority of combinations are discarded during this process. In the later
stages, multilocation evaluation normally takes place to determine the
degree of adaptation of the remaining lines to the target environments.
At the end of the process, the breeder normally submits a small number
of lines for independent evaluation before they are released to the
farmer.
19. Sometimes crosses are made that are not intended to deliver a variety
directly, but rather to produce improved parents for further crossing
(‘pre-breeding’). Much of the use of PGRFA takes this form.
20. The development of new varieties depends on the use of genetic
resources over a long period: the whole process of breeding and
releasing a new variety can take at least 10 years and often takes longer.
The rice variety IR36, for example, has 15 landraces and one wild species
in its heritage and was the result of some 20 years of breeding work.
21. Molecular biological techniques are providing new tools for plant
breeding. Genes can now be transferred across species barriers or even
from the animal kingdom into plants. Although to date relatively few
varieties have been developed through such gene transfers, the number
of successes will undoubtedly increase in the future. The potential
contribution of the new techniques is enormous.
 
 The Policy Context
22. The question of access to PGRFA has been at the heart of the debate
surrounding plant genetic resources for more than 15 years.  The
International Undertaking originally subscribed to the concept of free
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exchange.18 The need for clarification concerning the application of this
principle led the FAO Commission to adopt two resolutions providing
an “agreed interpretation”.19 Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBR) were
explicitly recognized to be “not incompatible with the Undertaking”,
thereby acknowledging that this intellectual property right does not
prevent free access to germplasm for breeding and research purposes. In
addition, the Commission agreed that “breeders’ lines and farmers’
breeding material should only be available at the discretion of the
developers during the period of development”. This provision brought
the Undertaking into conformity with national laws on private property.
The “agreed interpretation” also stated that the term “free access” does
not necessarily mean free of charge. The FAO Commission later
acknowledged that access to genetic resources requires further
clarification, and made it one of the primary issues to be resolved during
the current round of negotiations.
 
23. In recent years, there has been a further erosion of the concept of free
exchange, as countries have exerted greater control over their genetic
resources and have introduced more conditions for access to them.
Subsequent modifications of the Undertaking have further restricted the
original concept of free access and common heritage.20
 
24. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)21 reaffirms national
sovereignty over genetic resources. It states that authority to determine
access to genetic resources rests with national governments and that access,
                                                     
18 "This Undertaking is based on the universally accepted principle that plant genetic resources
are a heritage of mankind and consequently should be available without restriction."
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Article 1.
19 Resolutions 4/89 and 5/89 adopted by the Twenty-fifth Session of the FAO Conference, Rome,
11-29 November, 1989 and incorporated into the International Undertaking as Annexes I and
II, respectively.
20 Annex II allows that farmers and breeders may decide whether to make the resources they
develop available to others and Annex III states that nations have sovereign rights over their
plant genetic resources.
21 The Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted by the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June
1992, and in force since 29 December 1993, is part of a comprehensive international attempt to
combat a broad range of environmental problems, including global warming, the destruction
of tropical forests, and the need to preserve the world’s biological resources on which the
survival of humanity depends. The Convention attempts to balance the interests of the South
and the North. It envisages a partnership whereby all countries conserve their genetic material
and make it available, in addition to providing access to relevant technologies and a share in
the benefits arising from the use of biodiversity. In contrast to the International Undertaking, it
represents a binding commitment on the countries that have ratified it. As of 1 March 1996, the
Convention had been ratified by 144 countries.
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where granted, should be subject to the prior informed consent of the
providing country on mutually agreed terms. The Convention thus
provides an international legal framework for regulating access and
encourages users to share benefits with countries providing genetic
resources.
 
25. The Global Plan of Action (GPA), which will be one of the chief outputs of
the forthcoming International Technical Conference on Plant Genetic
Resources,22 will serve as a tool for implementing the CBD with regard to
PGRFA. The GPA, which has conservation and use of genetic resources as
its chief aims, is expected to target resources to global priorities and to
increase the effectiveness of international conservation efforts. The
successful implementation of the GPA will depend upon the continued
availability of PGRFA. This will in turn rest upon the accommodation of
the principles of sovereign rights and benefit-sharing in any future
system of germplasm exchange.
 
26. There are concerns that these principles might lead to greater restrictions
on the exchange of genetic resources. While the Convention clearly seeks to
facilitate access, it also recognizes that “the authority to determine access
to genetic resources rests with national governments”. In response, a
number of countries have already started to regulate germplasm
transfers. For example, African nations have imposed a temporary ban
on the transfer of any biological resources not covered by existing
conventions and where prior informed consent is not in effect.23 Other
countries have introduced specific control mechanisms (e.g. the
Philippines24) or are negotiating regional exchange arrangements that
would control the release of genetic material from member states to
outsiders (e.g. the Andean Pact countries).
 
27. Given these concerns and current political realities, it appears that the
current informal approach to exchange is no longer broadly acceptable. It is
                                                     
22 The International Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources, scheduled for June 1996, will
provide a major intergovernmental forum for considering the first Report on the State of the
World’s Plant Genetic Resources and a Global Plan of Action. The Conference will address both the
conservation and use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.
23 African Common Perspectives and Position on the Convention on Biological Diversity.
AMCEN/Conventions/CBD1. 26 October 1994.
24 Philippines Presidential Executive Order no. 247, adopted 18 May 1995, requires research
agreements between collectors and the government concerning the provision of information
and samples, technology cooperation and benefit-sharing. All research “directly or indirectly
intended for commercial purposes” requires the more stringent Commercial Research
agreement. Prior informed consent is required from concerned local and indigenous
communities.
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critical therefore that agreement be reached on an effective system for the
exchange of PGRFA. Such a system should help ensure efficient
conservation, promote access and use, and ensure an equitable sharing of
any benefits arising from the commercial exploitation of PGRFA. It should
conform to both the letter and the spirit of the CBD and should aim to
minimize transaction costs while maximizing efficiency and effectiveness.
In response to its mandate from the FAO Commission, this study will
explore the feasibility of a number of approaches to exchange, taking into
account the requirements and concerns of all stakeholders, including
farmers and community groups.
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 Pedigree of VEERY wheat (Triticum vulgare)
 released by CIMMYT in 1977.
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 Chapter II.  System Options
 
1. A fundamental aim of sustainable agricultural development is to meet
the nutritional requirements of a global population that is expected to
increase from 5.5 billion (thousand million) to 8.5 billion by 202525.
Genetic resources for food and agriculture lie at the heart of sustainable
agricultural development. They provide both the means to ensure food
security (at an individual, community, national or international level)
and to enhance the role of agriculture as an engine for economic
development. Any system for the exchange of genetic resources and the
equitable sharing of benefits must support continuing efforts to achieve
these goals.
 
2. In the context of discussions on germplasm exchange, it is necessary to
distinguish between plants with potential use in industry, and plant
genetic resources for food and agriculture. In the use of genetic resources
for pharmaceutical purposes, for example, a chemical compound may be
identified, extracted and then synthesized in a laboratory anywhere in the
world. The source of the useful gene or compound in this case is normally
clear. Also, there are distinct commercial interests involved in the
development of industrial products, with proven markets and the prospect
of large profits. This has tended to lead to a situation where scientists are
reluctant to share information or material and where secrecy and
intellectual property protection are the norm.
 
3. PGRFA present a very different situation. Unlike the single active
compound in many pharmaceuticals, a new crop line is likely to have a
complicated pedigree and to owe its effectiveness to the combination of
genes originating from many ancestors. Even if a pharmaceutical is not
entirely synthesized, the bulk manufacture of the product will involve
large-scale operations in a chemical factory. While genetic engineering in a
lab may contribute to crop development, the end product is grown in
farmers’ fields. Another distinction is that 80% of the seed required for
planting in developing countries is saved by farmers or exchanged by
them26 rather than purchased on the commercial market, with the result
that the global market for seed is comparatively small.27
                                                     
25 Agenda 21, Chapter 14.
26 The World Seed Market: Development and Strategy. A Study by Rabobank Nederland
Agribusiness Research. Utrecht, The Netherlands. 1994.
27 The world market for commercial seed in 1990 was valued at $15 billion of which $1.75 billion
accounted for horticultural seed. The World Seed Market - Developments and Strategy,
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 Criteria for an Effective Exchange System
4. While there have been attempts to quantify the benefits currently
flowing internationally to both providers and users of germplasm, this
information is far from comprehensive. Nevertheless, the qualitative
benefits of international cooperation are well known. To be effective,
any system for the international exchange of genetic resources should, at
a minimum, provide the same range of benefits as are currently
available, including:
 
 l  opportunities for more comprehensive and cost-effective conservation
5. Approximately 6.1 million samples are presently maintained in ex situ
collections,28 at an annual average cost of US$50 per sample,29 resulting
in an annual cost of US$305 million world-wide. These costs are bound
to rise in the coming years as more material is collected and
systematically duplicated for security reasons. Given the conservation
responsibilities imposed on countries by the CBD, there is likely to be an
increased demand for the development of cost-effective approaches to ex
situ conservation at the national level. Greater attention is also expected
to be given to conserving PGRFA in situ and to supporting traditional
conservation activities by farming communities.
 
6. International cooperation provides countries with increased
opportunities for developing joint conservation and use strategies and
for sharing responsibilities and costs regionally and/or globally. These
strategies might include arrangements to meet national storage or safety
duplication needs through international cooperation.
 
7. The in-trust collections of the CGIAR provide a very significant resource
to the international community. In addition to supplying germplasm to
breeding programmes, the Centres provide a range of related services,
for example the restoration of genetic resources which have been lost
(see box below).
 
                                                                                                                                               
Rabobank Nederland, 1994. By contrast, the global market for pharmaceutical products is $235
billion per annum. ten Kate, K.., Biopiracy or green petroleum? Expectations and Best Practice
in Bioprospecting. Overseas Development Administration, London. 1995
28 FAO (1996) Report on the State of the World’s Plant Genetic Resources, Document CGRFA-
EX2/96/2 of the Second Extraordinary Session of the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture, April 22-27, 1996.
29 Keystone International Dialogue Series on Plant Genetic Resources. Oslo Plenary Session. Final
Consensus Report: Global Initiative for the Security and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic
Resources. Oslo, Norway. Third Plenary Session.  May 31-June 4, 1991.
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            Restoration of germplasm
The value of shared conservation efforts is evident in the joint
effort carried out by the International Rice Research Institute
(IRRI) and national programs in Asia. Since 1981, IRRI has
restored hundreds of rice samples to Nepal, Pakistan,
Thailand, Philippines and Sri Lanka. More recently, 5311
duplicated accessions of traditional cultivars – jointly collected
in Assam and neighbouring regions in northeast India – were
sent back to national facilities in India. Much of the original
Assam collection had deteriorated or had been lost.
30
 
 l  access to genetic resources from different sources for use in research
and breeding
8. A principal benefit of international collaboration is that it allows
participants to gain access to a wider range of genetic material than can
be found within their borders. Landraces and wild relatives of major
food crops are often distributed over wide geographical areas in their
regions of diversity. Facilitated access and international collaboration is
particularly critical for collecting and screening these materials, some of
which contain useful traits that are still to be identified and are at risk of
extinction.
 
 l  access to improved germplasm
9. As noted in the previous chapter, plant breeding is a complex and
lengthy process. Relatively few national institutes have adequate
resources to devote to developing improved genetic materials. For
example, more than 50% of African countries identify lack of funds as
the major constraint to their breeding activities while 45% of the Near
Eastern countries report lack of human resources as the major
constraint.31
 
10. International cooperation can provide access to improved germplasm
that meets users’ needs for specific characteristics. For countries without
fully developed breeding programmes, cooperation enables them to
gain access to a range of varieties for testing under local conditions. It
also can facilitate the introduction of new crops to enrich existing
agricultural systems.
 
                                                     
30 Geneflow, IPGRI. 1995.
31 FAO (1996) Report on the State of the World’s Plant Genetic Resources, Document CGRFA-
EX2/96/2 of the Second Extraordinary Session of the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture, April 22-27, 1996.
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 l  access to information and technologies
11. Despite the revolution in data-gathering and dissemination that has
occurred over the past decade, information on genetic resources is still
unevenly distributed around the world. Some institutions maintain
advanced databases and are linked into international information
networks. Many others, particularly in developing countries, have
limited facilities for refining and maintaining databases, and little or no
opportunity to exchange information on an international basis.
International collaboration offers significant opportunities to right this
imbalance by facilitating access by collaborators to global information
resources.
 
12. The scientific and technical basis for many areas of genetic resources
conservation remains weak, despite recent important advances.
International cooperation provides better opportunities for joint efforts
to devise solutions to common needs, such as low-cost seed storage
techniques and the refinement of sampling strategies for collecting and
regeneration. It also provides opportunities for the transfer of relevant
technologies developed by partner countries which can be refined and
adapted to meet national needs.
 
 l  participation in joint research
13. Thousands of researchers throughout the world are already working to
produce the knowledge required to conserve and use genetic resources.
But their numbers are small in relation to the task, and in many
countries their efforts are severely handicapped by lack of funds.
14. International collaboration in research and the sharing of research
results is a cost-effective means to build capacities in national
programmes and to develop a stronger scientific basis for conservation
efforts world-wide.
 
 l  access to training
15. In addition its direct benefits, training is an ideal means to effect
technology transfer, as well as being one of the most important steps
towards building strong national programmes. Many different branches
of science are involved in plant genetic resources efforts and a lack of
expertise in any one of them can prevent a country from realizing the
full value of its biological assets.
 
16. It is unlikely that any single national institute will have the capacity to
train people in all aspects of plant genetic resources conservation and
use. An international approach to training allows countries and
institutions facing similar challenges to share the costs and burdens of
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developing training courses and to pool resources and expertise to meet
common needs and problems.
 
 
 Types of International Cooperation
17. International cooperation in the conservation, use and exchange of crop
germplasm can occur on either a bilateral or a multilateral basis.
Bilateral arrangements refer to partnerships negotiated between two
parties for their mutual benefit and generally formalized through a
contract or memorandum of understanding. Multilateral arrangements
involve several parties sharing the costs and benefits of collaboration. As
noted above, current multilateral arrangements for the exchange of
genetic resources and information are generally conducted without a
formal agreement outlining terms and conditions.
 
18. Bilateral arrangements have long been used in industry, typically taking
the form of material transfer agreements (MTAs) which govern the
exchange of genetic resources. There are also bilateral exchange
agreements between governments, for example the agreement between
Brazil and Malaysia to exchange Hevea (rubber) (see below).
A Bilateral Agreement:  Brazil–Malaysia Agreement on Hevea
19. In 1995, the Brazilian Agriculture Research Corporation (EMBRAPA)
and the Rubber Research Institute of Malaysia (RRIM) signed an
agreement whereby EMBRAPA would exchange Brazilian wild
materials of the genus Hevea for elite clones of Hevea braziliensis
developed by RRIM. A collecting expedition was carried out in the
Brazilian Amazon under the terms of national legislation. These require
that at least 50% of collected materials must remain in Brazil and that a
Brazilian institution must participate in field explorations. Improved
clones selected by RRIM from these materials can be transferred to third
parties only after EMBRAPA’s authorization.  In exchange for the wild
materials collected in the Amazon, RRIM has sent nearly 80 elite clones
to EMBRAPA. The materials negotiated under this agreement can only
be used for scientific and technological development.32
 
20. As noted in Chapter 1, an informal multilateral system has been in place
for many years exchanging more than 650 000 accessions every year.
Materials from this system have found their way into the bulk of
                                                     
32 Information provided by Brazilian National Research Center for Genetic Resources and
Biotechnology (CENARGEN).
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existing crops and have benefited both developing and developed
countries. For example, wheat varieties containing germplasm
developed by the International Center for the Improvement of Maize
and Wheat (CIMMYT) are grown in virtually all wheat-growing
countries of the world and cover 81% of the wheat-growing area in Latin




 Characteristics of Bilateral and Multilateral Systems
21. Both bilateral and multilateral systems have advantages and
disadvantages making one or the other approach preferable in a given
situation. For example, the limited focus of bilateral arrangements
allows partners to reach agreement and deliver results more quickly
than is generally possible within the context of a larger partnership. A
comparatively rapid turnaround may be suitable in situations where, for
example, the speed of product development confers a competitive
advantage.
 
22. Bilateral arrangements often have the advantage of flexibility; their
structures, rules and goals can be easily and quickly modified to
respond to changing needs. A bilateral agreement can be tailored to the
needs and circumstances of the parties and can deliver targeted and
highly focused results. Parties collaborate based on their shared
objectives, and are able to exploit their respective comparative
advantages without risk of diluting their efforts through the need to
collaborate with partners that have less in common.
 
23. Bilateral partnerships can be created for specific purposes and then
dissolved, without the need for permanent institutional structures. Thus
bilateral arrangements frequently have lower overhead costs than
multilateral approaches to exchange.
 
24. Bilateral arrangements are often used to ensure safe conservation, for
example when one genebank arranges with another to hold a duplicate
set of material. Multilateral systems, however, also offer opportunities
for developing common and cost-effective conservation strategies, and
for coordination and mutual support among partners.
                                                     
33 For further information on the impact of CGIAR Centre-developed germplasm in Latin
America, see CIAT, CIMMYT, CIP, 1992.  The Role of CIAT, CIMMYT and CIP in Agricultural
Research in Latin America and the Caribbean: Relevance and Results (unpublished).
34 Tribe, Derek. Feeding and Greening the World. The Role of International Agricultural Research.
CAB International. Wallingford, UK. page 224.
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25. For species with a wide distribution of genetic diversity, as is the case
with most major food crop species, any one country might contain only
a small fraction of the total diversity. A multilateral system offers
participants access to a far greater range of germplasm than is generally
possible in bilateral arrangements. For example, the world’s largest and
most complete collection of rice – located at the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines – comprises more than 80 000
samples from 111 countries. The collection includes, for example, 8454
samples from Indonesia, 799 samples from Sierra Leone and 849 samples
from Brazil.35 These countries – and all others – have ready access to the
entire collection. For any one country to have access to the same range of
rice diversity through bilateral arrangements, it would be necessary to
conclude agreements with 110 countries. For all countries represented in
the IRRI collection to have access to this material, a total of 12 210
bilateral agreements would be necessary.
 
26. The previous point demonstrates a clear advantage of multilateral
arrangements for crops with wide geographical distribution. This
advantage is even greater if one considers a range of crop species.
Countries with limited genetic diversity of one crop might well hold a
large proportion of the diversity of another. Access to the required
germplasm might be difficult to arrange bilaterally, especially if the
institutions involved are only interested in a narrow range of species.
Certain institutions in West Asia, for example, might need access to rice
germplasm from Southeast Asia, while some Southeast Asian
institutions might need access to sweet potato germplasm from Latin
America where yet others might be more interested in wheat germplasm
from West Asia.
 
27. Multilateral approaches are likely to provide greater opportunities for
exchanging and screening genetic resources than bilateral arrangements.
Evaluation of data from a large number of environments leads to a
better understanding of the properties of the exchanged material,
adding significantly to its value and increasing the chances that it will be
used.
 
28. Sometimes the characteristics of a sample are known in advance (e.g. as
a result of local or indigenous knowledge, or an earlier screening). In
such cases, direct bilateral negotiations between the holder of the
                                                     
35 Report of the External Review Panel on CGIAR Genebank Operations, International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI). December 1995
32 ISSUES IN GENETIC RESOURCES NO. 4
INTERNATIONAL PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES INSTITUTE
germplasm and the recipient may be the most efficient and appropriate
means of allowing access on mutually agreed terms. However, more
commonly, the existence of genes conferring the desired characteristic is
completely unknown, or perhaps only conjectured.
 
29. The search for useful genes and chemicals may involve the screening of
a large number of species, and thousands or tens of thousands of
different samples. In the search for naturally occurring chemicals for
pharmaceutical use, access to species and genetic diversity might best be
gained through bilateral agreements with species-rich countries. Plant
breeders, however, generally screen a large number of genetically
diverse samples of a single crop species. Given the wide geographic
distribution of genetic diversity of most major food crop species,
bilateral agreements would thus have to be concluded with a large
number of countries or institutions in order to gain access to a
significant proportion of the genepool for screening, a prerequisite to
progress in breeding.
 
30. Germplasm is only truly useful when accompanied by information. The
information that makes an accession attractive to researchers includes
passport data,36 characterization data,37 evaluation data38 and
ethnobotanical information.39 Bilateral arrangements can, and often do,
include provisions for sharing information. As they are limited to two
partners, bilateral arrangements offer far greater confidentiality than is
generally possible with multilateral arrangements. They are thus well
suited to maintaining the secrecy that may surround the development of
certain products, or when proprietary information or technologies are
shared.
 
31. A multilateral system, on the other hand, can provide greater
opportunities for pooling efforts on characterization and evaluation. It
provides access to a wider range of information than is available
bilaterally, and offers opportunities to use information cost-effectively,
avoiding duplication and unnecessary expense by sharing databases, for
example.
 
                                                     
36 Passport data include information on the origin of the material, the date of collection and
environmental conditions.
37 Characterization data include morphological, biochemical and molecular information.
38 Evaluation data include information on yield potential, phenology and pest and disease
resistance.
39 Ethnobotanical information relates to local uses and locally observed traits.
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32. The release of materials from genebanks is easier and more cost-effective
if standard conditions can be applied to their acquisition and
distribution. While it would be possible for genebanks to negotiate the
terms of release bilaterally, they might be forced to turn down materials
if it were not possible to reach agreement on the terms. A better
approach would allow the negotiation of multilateral agreements
concerning standard terms and conditions covering the exchange of
materials held in partner genebanks. It should be noted that, in general,
current arrangements for the exchange of genetic resources are not
standardized, an exception being the standard agreements that
accompany the release of materials from CGIAR genebanks.
 
33. Crop varieties typically contain genes from many different sources.
Modern varieties, especially those with a long history of breeding, may
have scores of lines in their parentage, originating from farms, local
communities and breeding programmes in many countries (see VEERY
box). To negotiate specific benefit-sharing arrangements with every
country of origin would be daunting. To negotiate with individual
farmers or communities would be virtually impossible. The enormous
costs of such negotiations and the implementation of multiple benefit-
sharing arrangements, would almost certainly result in a drastic
reduction of the use of new germplasm. The consequence would be an
even greater recycling of existing germplasm than already occurs,
leading to a further narrowing of the genetic base of crop varieties. Such
an effect runs counter to the widely held belief that sustainable
agricultural production and food security world-wide are best served by
broadening the genetic base of crop production. Multilateral approaches
to exchanging germplasm and benefit-sharing could prevent such a
situation and might even lead to greater use of genetic resources and a
broadening of the genetic base of crops.
 
34. In rare instances, a patented product – such as a new pharmaceutical
drug – which derives from a compound found by screening plants may
produce annual sales of several hundreds of millions of dollars. This
situation might lend itself to bilateral negotiations between provider and
user. However, the probability that an individual sample of a natural
product will proceed through screening, elucidation of structure and
activity, bulk manufacture of the active compound or its analogue,
preclinical and clinical trials, and marketing is extremely low:  in the
order of one in ten thousand.40 The process can cost several hundred
                                                     
40 ten Kate, Kerry, Biopiracy or green petroleum? Expectations and Best Practice in
Bioprospecting, Overseas Development Administration, London. 1995.
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million dollars and may take fifteen years or more to complete.
Nevertheless, the high value of the profits and the relatively few
stakeholders amongst whom they would be shared could merit the
transaction costs involved in bilateral arrangements.
 
35. Most crop varieties, however, have modest annual sales in the tens or
hundreds of thousands of dollars and are likely to have a pedigree
combining genes from many sources. For crops, the profits from any
bilaterally negotiated sharing of benefits or royalties arising from a
commercialized variety are likely to be extremely small, especially given
the large number of potential stakeholders.41 In most cases, the cost of
negotiating and monitoring and the payment of legal fees would
consume a major part, if not all, of the potential revenues. Commercial
endeavours would then become unattractive.
 
36. Bilateral arrangements offer opportunities for developing specific
research partnerships and training activities. Multilateral arrangements
have also proven to be highly effective in fostering a supportive climate
for innovation, as well as in promoting collaborative research and
providing training opportunities at a wide range of specialized
institutions. However, in the case of multilateral arrangements, these
benefits are less likely to be directly linked to the provision of access to
specified germplasm. One example of successful multilateral
collaboration is the development of core collections which aim to
promote the use of genetic resources contained in large collections (see
below).
Core Collections
37. A core collection consists of a limited set of accessions usually
containing less than 10% of the total number of samples in a collection.
Despite their relatively small size, core collections are expected to
contain over 70% of the total genetic variation found in the collection.
Core collections can be based on a single international or national
collection or on a number of different collections. Core collections can
lead to more rational germplasm conservation and use through:
 *  identifying gaps in the collection
 *  assigning priorities in regeneration
 *  promoting rational characterization and evaluation
 *  assisting breeders in searching for useful traits
 *  facilitating germplasm distribution.
 
                                                     
41 See Annex IV.
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38. Core collections are not seen as a mechanism for reducing the total size
of collections. The diversity present in the remaining samples, which is
not present in the core collection, represents a resource that cannot be
discarded.
 
39. A number of core collections have been established and more are
planned. The CIAT Phaseolus core collection contains 1500 accessions out
of a total of 24 000. There is currently an international initiative
underway to develop a barley core collection which will contain about
2000 accessions, or approximately 4% of the 50 000 barley accessions
held around the world that are assumed to be unique.42
40. In summary, both bilateral and multilateral approaches have their place.
Bilateral approaches are likely to be appropriate when a limited number
of countries or institutions share or need access to genetic diversity, or
when highly expensive and specialized research gives a strong
competitive advantage to a single or limited number of partners. Such
conditions may prevail, for example, in the case of some industrial crops
such as rubber and in certain sectors, for example pharmaceuticals.
 
41. Multilateral approaches may be more appropriate in situations where
many countries share the total genepool of a crop, when breeders in
many countries need to access the genetic resources, and when broad
cooperation to meet global goals such as food security may be more
effective than the efforts of a few individuals or institutions. These
conditions prevail for the majority of staple food crops, for which
exclusively bilateral arrangements could become inordinately complex




42. The options for exchange systems fall into three broad categories: a
strictly bilateral approach, an informal multilateral approach and a
multilateral framework guided by mutually agreed rules.
 
43. Exclusively bilateral arrangements have rarely been reported in the case
of staple food crops but are certain to be extremely complicated for the
reasons given above. Strictly bilateral approaches to the exchange of
food crop germplasm are therefore likely to prove excessively
                                                     
42 T. Hodgkin, Th. J. L. van Hintum and B. A. U. Morales, editors. “Core Collections of Plant
Genetic Resources”. John Morley and Sons, 1995. Copublished by IPGRI and Sayce
Publications, UK.
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cumbersome and thus this option is not given further consideration in
the report.
 
44. A second option characterizes the current approach to the exchange of
germplasm, an informal system comprising national programmes and
other partners, including CGIAR Centres, NGOs and the private sector.
This approach is extremely flexible and cost-effective. It has had
remarkable success in pushing forward the frontiers of genetic resource
science over the past two decades. However, a lack of clarity concerning
the rights and obligations associated with participation in the system has
left it open to charges of non-transparency. In addition, some countries
are concerned that the current approach does not meet the requirements
of the CBD with regard to its provisions for access and benefit-sharing.
Thus there appears to be a need for a more formalized approach to
exchange, although one that retains the essential features of the current
system.
 
45. The third broad option (henceforth referred to as “MUSE” 43) describes
such an approach: a flexible multilateral framework governed by
mutually agreed rules. The CBD would set the context for MUSE and
would provide the guiding principles for the system. The MUSE rules
would provide formal clarification – and protection – of the rights and
obligations associated with the exchange of PGR under the terms of the
CBD.
 
46. At the heart of the MUSE option lie the objectives of facilitating access
and sharing benefits on a multilateral basis. However, the MUSE
framework could accommodate any one or a number of the alternatives
existing between the extremes of purely bilateral arrangements and an
informal multilateral approach to exchange. For example, MUSE could
make provision for benefit-sharing on a bilateral basis under certain
circumstances, typically upon commercialization.44 Another scenario
might include a fund as a mechanism for financial compensation in
return for access and in recognition of the concept of Farmers’ Rights.
Yet another approach might be to decide that the costs and effort of
sharing financial benefits arising from the commercialization of crop
germplasm would outweigh any potential advantages, and instead to
restrict benefit-sharing to such things as access to germplasm,
information, technology and training. A combination of these scenarios
might coexist within the MUSE framework and be applied according to
                                                     
43 A Multilateral System for Exchange.
44 See also Annex IV.
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circumstances. For instance, the scenario providing for bilateral
negotiations might apply in the case of non-food crops only.
 
47. Whatever form it might take, MUSE would operate according to
standard rules governing conditions of membership, terms of access to
genetic resources, mechanisms for sharing benefits among participants,
and relationships with non-members. To preserve the chief benefit of the
current system – its flexibility – these rules should be the absolute
minimum required to guarantee that the rights and obligations of all
stakeholders are respected. At the same time, they must be adequate to
support a framework for the successful implementation of the CBD and
the Global Plan of Action. The table on the following pages sets out the
advantages and disadvantages of options of systems of exchange.
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48. The following chapter further explores elements of the MUSE option,
including the benefits associated with participation in the system and
possible scenarios within the basic MUSE framework. Chapter IV
concerns the possible range of biological materials that could be made
available through the system.
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 Part II.  A Multilateral System for Exchange (MUSE)
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 Chapter III.  Options for Implementing a Multilateral System
for Exchange (MUSE)
 Membership
1. Membership in MUSE would be voluntary and would be open to any
country, organization or institution which has something to offer and to
gain from the system and which agrees to abide by the rules, including
those of the individual networks in which it participates. Members
might include farmers’ organizations, indigenous and local community
groups, government institutions, private sector not-for-profit institutions
and for-profit companies, national and international non-governmental
organizations, university departments, regional institutions and




2. The Convention on Biological Diversity would set the guiding principles
for MUSE in areas such as access to genetic resources on mutually
agreed terms, prior informed consent and the equitable sharing of
benefits.
 
3. Countries wishing to join MUSE would sign an agreement. The FAO
Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture might
consider negotiating such an agreement within the context of the revised
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources. In signing the
MUSE Agreement, countries would agree to collaborate and to operate
according to standard rules governing conditions of membership, terms
of access to that subset of genetic resources that members decide to
include in the scope of the system (see Chapter IV), mechanisms for
sharing benefits among participants, and relationships with non-
members. The subsequent governance and monitoring of MUSE,
including responsibility for revising the MUSE rules to meet changing
needs, would rest with government members.
 
4. By acceding to the Agreement, signatory states would agree to the
MUSE provisions on prior informed consent (PIC)45 and mutually
                                                     
45 To give prior informed consent is to agree, before it occurs, to an event whose implications have
been disclosed in advance. It is a legal procedure that recognizes the right of individuals or
States to exert control over events affecting them or resources within their control.
     The CBD introduces a requirement for Contracting Parties to provide genetic resources on the
basis of prior informed consent. The Convention does not define prior informed consent;
however, Article 15 stipulates that the authority to determine access is subject to national
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agreed terms (MAT),46 thus meeting the requirements of the
Convention. When countries with no legislation on germplasm
exchange ratify the Agreement, in most cases its provisions would
automatically become national law. However, certain countries may be
unable to adhere to the MUSE Agreement without adapting or
introducing national laws and regulations to bring them in line with the
Agreement. An institution based in a non-member country where
national legislation runs counter to the MUSE Agreement might not be
eligible for membership.47
 
5. The state is sovereign over all the plant genetic resources in its
jurisdiction. However, many of these resources will be under private
ownership, so that a state’s agreement to participate in MUSE may not
be sufficient to determine access to all of the materials within its borders.
Publicly held material covered by the scope of the system would
logically enter MUSE as a condition of a country’s decision to join the
system. The situation regarding other materials within a country,
however, may vary from country to country, the determination of who
has the right to negotiate access to material within a country’s borders
being a matter for national legislation. The PIC of local communities and
of other non-government holders of genetic resources would therefore
be established through instruments determining their participation in or
relationship to MUSE, and in accordance with national policy and
legislation. Such instruments might in turn contain provisions for
recognizing Farmers’ Rights.
 
6. Conditions for non-government members (private institutions, NGOs,
farmers and indigenous communities, etc.) would be set by government
members, whose responsibility it would then be to determine how best
to implement and enforce these conditions at the national level.
Governments might, for example, allow institutions to join MUSE by
entering into an agreement at the national level or with the system as a
whole. The latter option might apply for institutes and organizations
                                                                                                                                               
legislation, so the definition of prior informed consent, and the decision whether to require or
dispense with it, is a matter for national law.
46 Mutual agreement on terms for access allows providers of genetic resources to control the terms
and conditions of their use. These terms are generally negotiated as part of the process of
securing prior informed consent. Just as for PIC, mutually agreed terms are required by the
Convention although their definition is left to national policy. MAT may include provisions for
the uses that may be made of the genetic resources provided, the sharing of benefits arising
from these uses, ownership and intellectual property rights and obligations not to pass the
resources or their derivatives on to third parties without securing similar undertakings from
them.
47 This would generally be the case when national legislation on PIC and MAT is more restrictive
than that contained in the MUSE Agreement.
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located in non-member countries or for international organizations such
as the CGIAR. Once they have joined MUSE, non-government members
would be bound by the same basic rules regulating access and benefit-
sharing as are contained in the MUSE Agreement.
 
7. All MUSE members would be free to pursue their own objectives as long
as these were consistent with the guiding principles and the rules of the
system. Within MUSE, institutions and organizations would collaborate
in a wide variety of arrangements. These arrangements would be guided
by operational procedures formulated by the collaborators and based on
the needs and circumstances of the networks, institutions and genepools
involved. The institutional arrangements within MUSE would be
flexible. They would provide a framework for the many networks that
already exist and would enable new networks to evolve to meet new
needs and opportunities.
 
8. MUSE would facilitate access by its members to all materials included in
its scope. The scope, which would be agreed by members, might include
both pre- and post-CBD materials, pre-CBD materials alone, or post-
CBD materials only. Likewise, there are a number of options for the type
of materials and the range of genepools to be covered by the system. For
example, MUSE might include only the genepools of crops of
importance to global food security. Alternatively, the system might only
cover food and other genetic resources that do not fall into that category,
leaving food security crops outside of the scope of MUSE. (See Chapter
IV for a detailed discussion of scope).
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 MUSE Guiding Principles, Rules and Procedures
 
 Policy
 MUSE guiding principles set by:
 The CBD, governing:
 recognition of sovereignty over genetic resources;
 access on mutually agreed terms;
 prior informed consent (PIC);
 equitable sharing of benefits.
 
 Oversight
 MUSE rules set by:
 Intergovernmental Body, governing:
 terms of the MUSE Agreement;
 scope of MUSE;
 terms of access and release;
 standard terms for PIC/MAT
 rights and obligations of members;
 sanctions for non-compliance;
 interaction with non-members.
 
 Membership
 Conditions for government membership set by:
 Terms of the MUSE Agreement
 Conditions for non-government membership set by:
 National governments, governing:
 nature of instrument binding member to MUSE
 rules;
 PIC/MAT of non-governmental participants;
 enforceability of MUSE rules.
 
 Implementation
 Operational procedures set by:
 networks and other institutional groupings, governing:
 mechanisms for germplasm exchange;
 implementation of sanctions;
 drafting of individual MTAs if required.
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 Germplasm Exchange in MUSE
9. There are three situations that would arise with regard to the exchange
of genetic resources within the context of MUSE. Material already
included in the scope of the system will be exchanged among members,
new material will come into the system, and material held in MUSE will
be transferred to non-member institutes or to countries outside of the
system. Access to materials covered by the system would be cost-free, or
at most involve a small service charge.
 
 Exchange of MUSE Material between Members
10. Any transfer among members of material already in the system will be
according to the terms of the MUSE Agreement. There will be no need
for a separate legal instrument when the terms of the Agreement can be
enforced in the recipient member’s country. If this is not the case, legally
binding agreements, such as MTAs, will be required.
 
 Introduction of New Material into MUSE
11. New material would be introduced into the MUSE mainly through
collecting in the field or directly from institutions outside of the system.
Countries would specify which entities are entitled to give their prior
informed consent to member institutes fielding collecting missions.
Materials would only enter the system if the provider is willing or able
to make it available under the standard PIC/MAT terms contained in
the MUSE Agreement. This would generally be the case in member
countries where national legislation would be consistent with the
Agreement. If it is not possible to obtain PIC/MAT terms consistent
with the MUSE Agreement, either because of national legislation or
because the provider is unwilling to agree, the materials would remain
outside of the system.
 
12. An MTA would be required in all cases where material is obtained from
non-member countries or from institutes outside the system. This
agreement would specify that materials provided by the non-member
henceforth become part of the system through the member
collector/recipient as intermediary. The non-member provider would
have continued access to the material supplied as well as any
information on the material that is generated by the recipients or from
within the system generally.
 
13. The MTA would be based on the terms of access set out in the MUSE
Agreement and would be of a standard form, to be negotiated by
government members of MUSE. The standard MTA would require the
user to share benefits (information, a negotiated share of royalties,
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leaseback, etc.) with the provider. It would allow recompense if a
provider discovered that a user had derived benefits from the
commercial use of material or a derivative of material that they
provided, but had not notified the provider of this fact, nor offered to
share any benefits.48 If the terms of the MTA are inconsistent with
national legislation regarding PIC/MAT, the agreement would be
invalid and the material would not be eligible to enter the system.
 
 Transfer of MUSE Material to Non-member Countries or Institutes
14. Genetic resources contained within the scope of the MUSE system could
be transferred to non-member countries or institutes on the basis of
standard MTAs according to the terms set out in the MUSE Agreement.
Such terms might include the requirement that the recipient make
information available on the material, would enter into bilateral benefit-
sharing negotiations under specified conditions, and would only pass
materials on to third parties under an MTA specifying equivalent
conditions. Non-member recipients might bear additional obligations to
those applying to members; for example, a requirement to provide
genetic resources and information to MUSE, or to make research
products available to members (or a subgroup of members such as
developing countries) on concessional terms.
 
 Infrastructure
15. A small secretariat would be required to ensure the effective
management of MUSE. An information service could also be established
to serve the needs of MUSE members, by for example maintaining
electronic information services49 and producing and/or distributing
other materials such as newsletters, journals and abstract bulletins. The
secretariat and information service could either be attached to an
existing organization or could operate through a dispersed system by
which individual institutions would agree to provide specific services,
perhaps in return for certain concessions, such as a reduction of
membership fees if it were decided to levy such fees. The information
service would work closely with, or could even be part of, the Clearing
                                                     
48 If the original provider were not party to the contract with the delinquent user and so could not
enforce it, the provider would initiate a claim against the entity with which it made the original
MTA and so on down the chain, each successive recipient ceding his/her rights to the original
provider until either the provider could initiate legal action against the delinquent user or, if
the chain has broken, against the entity that failed to pass on the benefit-sharing obligations
(see also Annex IV).
49 The CGIAR is currently linking its Centre databases on plant genetic resources electronically
and developing the means to provide access to them internationally. The CGIAR data system,
known as SINGER (The System-Wide Information Network on Genetic Resources) might form
the hub of a larger network within MUSE that integrates and links databases made available by
other members.
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16. All countries, organizations and institutions joining MUSE could be
required to pay a membership fee to cover the operational costs of
running MUSE, including the secretariat and the information unit. Any
remaining funds might be used to support special services, such as
training, workshops, etc. A differential rate might be applied to
members according to whether they were located in developed or
developing countries, whether they were primarily providers or users of
germplasm, or whether they were non-government members located in
member or non-member countries.
 
 Collective Benefits
17. Wide participation in MUSE would depend on the merit of the system
relative to available alternatives. Providers of germplasm need an
incentive to supply materials to the system; otherwise they are likely to
prefer to exchange material bilaterally or by some other means.
Recipients of germplasm will be motivated to join the system in order to
have access to material for developing new products. However, they
will only find membership of interest if the conditions of access and the
transaction costs involved are favourable compared with alternative
sources of supply.
 
18. As previously noted, international cooperation in the field of genetic
resources can give rise to a wide range of benefits. Participation in a
multilateral exchange system has particular advantages in the case of
food crop genetic resources and these have been enumerated at length in
earlier sections of the report. It should be noted that these advantages
are not uniquely available under the MUSE option. The principal – and
unique – value of MUSE lies in its clarification of the nature of benefits
available under the system, the establishment of rules and procedures
governing access and benefit-sharing, and the creation of mechanisms
allowing members greater opportunities for collaboration and more
information on how to access the MUSE benefits. The relative
transparency afforded by a more formal approach to exchange is likely
to give rise to a number of key benefits as described below.
 
 l  broadening the base of participation
19. Participation in a multilateral system – whether regulated or not – is
theoretically open to all stakeholders with an interest in PGRFA,
something to offer and something to gain by participating in the system.
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These include farmers’ organizations, indigenous and local community
groups, government institutions, private sector not-for-profit institutions
and for-profit companies, national and international non-governmental
organizations, university departments, regional institutions and
international organizations such as the CGIAR.
 
20. The current approach to multilateral exchange is fundamentally
informal in nature. For this reason, its success largely depends on the
existence of good will and trust among those involved. This has tended
to limit participation to institutions that know each other well and that
have a long history of working together. Other stakeholders – such as
farmers and grassroots organizations and institutions that have not
previously participated in the current exchange system – may not know
of its existence or may not know how it functions and how they could
benefit by participation. Furthermore, a lack of clarity concerning the
basis for access and benefit-sharing, the possibility of intellectual
property protection being imposed on altered materials, and the fact that
the position on these issues is not codified in rules upon which
stakeholders can rely, mean that there is no guarantee that stakeholders
would benefit fairly and appropriately from participation. This has
created reluctance on the part of some stakeholders to become involved
in the current system so that, ironically, the very informality of the
present approach has led to a rather more closed and restricted system
than is probably desirable.
 
21. The Convention on Biological Diversity explicitly recognizes the
important role of indigenous and local communities in the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity. A regulated exchange system
such as MUSE could prove a useful means of encouraging the
participation of these groups in the global effort. Such a system would
be ordered by a set of rules which, while minimal, would apply to all
members and, to the extent possible, would be enforceable. The result
would be a more open and transparent system in which the rights and
obligations of all members would be clearly specified and protected by
the system. This is likely to make participation more attractive to
stakeholders who have not engaged in the current system, such as
farmers’ groups, etc. Perhaps more importantly, it would acknowledge
the right of these groups to participate fully in international exchange
systems and the obligation to ensure that they receive a fair share of
benefits as a result of their participation.
 
22. The advantages of a more broadly based exchange system could be
significant. For example, the likelihood that MUSE will be attractive to
new partners such as farmers’ groups and indigenous communities
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should lead to increased opportunities for integrating on-farm
conservation into the global genetic resources effort. In addition, by
improving links with these groups, MUSE would offer the potential to
promote community breeding efforts and participatory breeding
approaches involving both government and non-government members
in new partnerships. Indeed, mechanisms to promote such partnerships
might be explicitly created within the context of MUSE.
 l  increased access to genetic resources
23. A fundamental benefit of the MUSE approach is that members would
have access to an enormous range of germplasm (including improved
materials) – far more than they contribute individually and more than
they could hope to gain from simple bilateral exchanges or informal
multilateral arrangements. This in turn would lead to the increased
likelihood of germplasm being used, as it would be readily available to a
wider range of potential users.
 
24. All providers of material, whether or not they have formally joined the
system, would retain the right to have continued and unrestricted access
to their material. Special arrangements might be needed to ensure that
communities and farmers groups providing germplasm to MUSE know
where their materials are being held and how they, and other genetic
resources, can be accessed.
 
 l  reduced transaction costs
25. Because current arrangements for the exchange of genetic resources are
not standardized, they tend to be made on a case-by-case basis. Even the
exchange system currently used by the CGIAR requires that each
transaction be treated individually, albeit under standard terms.50 The
adoption of standard terms and conditions under MUSE could greatly
reduce the necessity for concluding individual agreements between
members exchanging materials within the scope of the system and is
therefore likely to substantially reduce transaction costs overall.
 l  adding value to the benefits of multilateral collaboration
26. Scientific institutes have long cooperated multilaterally in the
conservation and exploitation of genetic resources. Such cooperation has
most often been carried out within the context of formal and informal
                                                     
50 Each shipment of material from the Centres is accompanied by a statement explaining the rights
and obligations of recipients, an order form which must be signed by the recipient and which
represents his/her agreement to abide by these obligations, and a shipment notice which
specifies the terms under which the materials are being sent.
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networks defined on a regional or a crop basis. Rules of procedure guide
the activities of participants within these networks but they are not
standardized across networks and may differ greatly with regard to
their requirements in terms of access and benefit-sharing.
 
27. The establishment of common guidelines and principles under MUSE
would not eliminate the need for network-specific rules to cover many
of the operations within networks. However, it is likely that it would
promote and facilitate greater cooperation between networks with
interests in similar crops, eco-regions, conservation methodologies, etc.
Indeed, as common rules would apply to all MUSE members, it is
possible to envisage collaboration among almost any grouping of
institutions, NGOs, farmers’ organizations, indigenous community
groups, universities, international centres and private-sector
organizations.
 
28. The MUSE option would provide a formal structure for addressing the
development of joint conservation strategies and for sharing the risks
and responsibilities, the benefits and burdens of conservation activities.
It would provide enhanced opportunities for pooling the resources –
genetic, human, and institutional – necessary to conserve and exploit
particular genepools effectively and efficiently.
 
29. As noted above, the MUSE structure would promote and sustain strong
linkages among system members. This would allow the development of
system-wide information networks which would facilitate access by
members to certain categories of technology and information, both on
the germplasm contributed by a member himself/herself as well as that
provided by others. Additional information would become available as a
result of activities such as screening trials conducted by recipient
members, and jointly conducted multilocational trials.
 
30. Finally, if it is decided to adopt one or more of the scenarios possible
within MUSE (see below) the system could facilitate bilateral sharing of
financial benefits through the adoption of agreed rules and procedures.




31. As noted in Chapter II, within the broad MUSE framework there is
scope for allowing all benefits to be shared multilaterally or for allowing
benefit-sharing on a bilateral basis under certain circumstances.
Alternatively (or in addition), MUSE might include a fund as a
mechanism for financial compensation in return for access and in
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recognition of the concept of Farmers’ Rights. These possible scenarios
within the basic MUSE model are discussed below.
 
 Scenario #1:  a fund
32. Members might wish to consider establishing a fund to compensate
germplasm providers. This would require careful negotiation. While not
essential to the successful implementation of MUSE, the existence of a
fund could provide an added incentive for some to join. Some see such a
fund as a mechanism for giving tangible recognition for Farmers’ Rights.
Others have doubts as to its feasibility, or at least as to the extent that it
could prove a significant source of funds. If MUSE members agreed to
establish a fund, they would have to consider mechanisms for its
establishment, governance, replenishment and allocation. The possibility
of establishing such a fund is currently under debate in other fora,
notably FAO, and several proposals to establish funding mechanisms
have been tabled.51 They will not be expanded upon here.
 Scenario #2:  provision for delivering bilateral benefits52
33. MUSE would deliver multilateral benefits on the basis of the MUSE
Agreement and through mechanisms built into the system. While
bilateral benefit-sharing might be possible within the context of the
system, these arrangements would be the responsibility of individual
members. They would be carried out, however, according to rules
established by MUSE.
 
 l  access to and transfer of proprietary technology
34. A bilateral arrangement could provide the opportunity for the transfer
of proprietary technologies to the provider of the material. This might
often be more attractive to both providers and users than negotiating an
appropriate share of what might frequently be insignificant royalty fees.
(see below). If users anticipate that their primary market for a particular
product or variety will be found in industrial countries, they might
agree to its production and sale in developing countries at no, or a
notional, royalty. This is unlikely to be an attractive option, however, if a
product is being produced for developing-country markets.
 
 l  capacity-building and technical cooperation
                                                     
51 M.S. Swaminathan, for example, proposes a levy on seed sales. This would increase seed
royalties from an average of 12 to 15 per cent with the difference contributing to a fund for
Farmers’ Rights. See Swaminathan, M.S. (Ed). “Farmers’ Rights and Plant Genetic Resources.
MacMillan India Ltd. 1995”.
52 See Annex IV for a discussion of the legal and institutional issues relating to this scenario.
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35. There are many other opportunities for bilateral benefit-sharing that are
consistent with the spirit and the law of the Convention on Biological
Diversity. These include agreements to conduct joint research, to
exchange scientists and train research personnel. In addition, users
might agree to contribute hardware and software or to produce seed of a
new variety in the providing country. In such a case, the primary
intention might be to develop the research capacity of the provider. The
details of these arrangements would be negotiated bilaterally with rules
and guidelines provided by the MUSE Agreement.
 
 l  financial benefits
36. In certain cases, users might agree to share financial benefits directly
with providers within the framework of MUSE. This would require
assessing the value of the supplied germplasm to a particular research
product. To the extent that these generally confidential arrangements are
public knowledge, pharmaceutical companies have agreed to offer
providers of genetic resources royalties on sales that are normally in the
range of 0.5% to 10%. These royalties would be shared between the
original provider or any intermediaries or collaborators who have added
value to the raw genetic resources. The original provider often receives
between 5% and 50% of the 0.5% to 10% royalty (i.e. perhaps as little of
0.025% of sales).53
 
37. Details of any financial benefit-sharing arrangements concerning the use
of plant genetic resources in agricultural research have yet to be
publicized. The market for agricultural research products is
comparatively small, and the profit potential limited.54 In addition, an
introduced line might account for only a tiny percentage of a variety’s
                                                     
53 ten Kate, K. 1995, Biopiracy or Green Petroleum? Expectations and Best Practice in
Bioprospecting. Overseas Development Administration, London.
54 The world market for commercial seed in 1990 was valued at $15 billion of which $1.75 billion
accounted for horticultural seed. (The World Seed Market - Developments and Strategy,
Rabobank Nederland, 1994). Assuming a high profitability of 4% on total sales, total industry
profits would amount to $530 million. If a generous 10% or $53 million (more than twice the
share used in a typical pharmaceutical agreement) were shared among providers; and two
highly successful varieties of each of 15 major crops were in the market of each of the world’s
10 major seed markets in any year (2x15x10=300), this would amount to an average share of
$175 000 per successful variety which then would have to be shared by several providers of
source material. On the basis of less optimistic projections about total industry profits, more
realistic assumptions about the number of successful varieties (five instead of two), and
considering that the major part of the genome of any new variety is likely to come from elite
germplasm already in the possession of the breeder, the amount available to be shared per
successful variety would probably be minuscule and would be absorbed by transaction costs.
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genetic make-up, making it very difficult to determine its contribution
and hence to arrive at an objective basis for calculating benefits.55
 
 Scenario #3:  combined scenarios
38. A combination of the scenarios described above could coexist within the
MUSE framework and be applied according to the specific
circumstances. For example, the provision for bilateral benefit-sharing
might apply in the case of non-food crops only.
                                                     
55 See Hardon, J.J. , Vosman B. and Th. J.J. van Hinthum. Identifying Genetic Resources and their
Origins: the Capabilities and Limitations of Modern Genetics and Legal systems, Background
Study Paper No.4, FAO/CPGR-Ex 1/94/Rep.
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 Chapter IV.  Scope
1. The implementation of a formal exchange system – MUSE – will require
the definition of the range of biological materials (“the scope”) that
would be available through the system.56 Criteria for defining scope
might include, among others: categories of plant genetic resources;
method of conservation; intended use of the materials; and/or whether
the materials were collected before or after the entry into force of the
Convention on Biological Diversity.
 
2. If the range of genetic resources available in the system is inadequate,
MUSE is unlikely to be attractive to potential members. Ideally, MUSE
members would include most countries holding significant amounts of
genetic diversity, whether by virtue of their location in centres of
diversity or as a result of their conservation and breeding activities.
 
3. Defining the optimum scope for MUSE is a challenge. There are
advantages and disadvantages to the various possible criteria for
determining the categories of genetic resources to be included and
excluded from the scope of the system. The rationale for distinguishing
between these categories, the institutional and economic implications of
the different potential bases for managing exchange and for enforcing
the terms of MUSE all contribute to this difficulty. At a minimum,
however, to attract broad participation, MUSE might include the
genepools of food crops of greatest importance to global food security.
Some options for scope are explored below.
 
 Scope Defined Comprehensively
4. The comprehensive option would include all species and categories of
plant genetic resources.57 Under this option, MUSE would become the
sole basis for access to plants, covering all locations in which they are
found – from ex situ collections to rainforests – and all uses – from
industrial to agricultural.
 
                                                     
56 The issue of scope with regard to exchange systems has arisen in various fora and is currently
under discussion by the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. See
also Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: Towards a Multilateral Agreement:
Proceedings from an Informal International Consultation held in Stockholm, 1-2 March 1995.
Edited by Carl-Gustaf Thornstrom, SAREC Documentation. Conference report 1995:1.
57  For example, wild relatives, primitive and modern varieties, landraces, breeding materials and
genetic stocks.
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5. This approach has the advantage of simplicity. It is unlikely, however, to
be attractive to some governments and companies that for commercial
reasons normally limit access to certain species and/or categories of
plant genetic resources – typically industrial crops or breeding lines.
 
 Scope Defined by Taxon or Genepool
6. Members might choose to define the scope of the system according to a
list of taxa, based on such criteria as relevance for food security, social
and economic importance, geographic distribution and the risk of
genetic erosion. Given the disparity of genetic diversity among countries
and their different needs for and uses of genetic material, the
determination of an internationally acceptable, taxonomically based
scope for MUSE would require careful negotiation, as would the
taxonomic basis for the list, whether genepool, genus, species or other
taxonomic class.
 
7. Genepool-based lists can be difficult to define. For many crops, reliable
information about the flow of genes between and among species is
limited and the distinction between taxa is often difficult to draw,
making the definition of many genepools somewhat arbitrary. A list of
genera, rather than a list of species, may be more appropriate in many
circumstances, for example when genes from related species have the
potential to contribute significantly to the improvement of the crop
species in question. This is increasingly the case with the growing ability
to make inter-specific crosses and to transfer genes across species
boundaries. Another option would be to combine both species and
genera in defining the scope of the system.
 
8. If the scope is defined by taxon or genepool, materials might be brought
into the system on an inclusive basis (i.e. a list would specify materials
included in the scope) or on an exclusive basis (i.e. a list would specify
what is not included). In either case, the list could be subject to periodic
review.
 
9. It may be difficult to compile an exclusive list since taxonomic
information about many species is inadequate and in many countries
good inventories of native species are lacking. New species are
frequently being discovered and taxonomic classifications are
continuously being revised. In addition, negotiators may see such an
approach as too open-ended. An inclusive list may be easier to compile,
although the danger exists that valuable species might be overlooked.
One possible approach might be to assemble a list that includes the plant
species which constitute the major food commodities required to meet
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national and global nutritional needs.58  Expert working groups might
then be convened to define the related species that would most usefully
constitute the genepool of each commodity in question.
 
10. The choice of such commodities could reflect current practice in the
networks involving the CGIAR Centres and their partners. The Centres
exchange genetic resources of approximately 25 major food crops, as
well as forages and multipurpose trees. The materials currently covered
by the CGIAR mandate could form the initial basis for developing the
scope of MUSE. The scope could be expanded by adding new food and
other crops, over time and as agreed by members. A decision would be
needed on whether forages and multipurpose trees should be
included.59
 
 Scope Defined by Category of Germplasm
11. The scope of the system could be based on different classes or categories
of germplasm. These include:
∗ wild species
∗ wild relatives of crop species
∗ landraces
∗ primitive and obsolete varieties
∗ modern varieties
∗ breeding lines and experimental populations
∗ lines with specific genetic and cytogenetic characteristics.
 
12. The above categories vary in the degree of “improvement” (i.e. the
degree of human interference) involved in their development, in actual
or potential legal ownership status and in strategic or commercial value.
 
13. In some situations, the availability of certain categories may be
restricted. For example, the International Undertaking states that the
availability of breeding material is left to the discretion of the plant
breeder concerned.60 The same might be the case with regard to material
held by farmers or farming communities. Genetic stocks are not usually
                                                     
58 Prescott-Allen, R and Prescott-Allen, C. How many plants feed the world? Conservation
Biology, 4 (4): 365-374, December 1990.
59 There is already some experience of defining scope by taxon or genepool. During its Sixth
Session in June 1995, the FAO Commission initiated discussions on the coverage of biological
materials during the renegotiation of the International Undertaking. A number of draft lists
defining the scope by different criteria were tabled. The difficulty of reaching agreement on
various categories of resource, such as forest species, indicates that the initial scope may best be
limited to food crops.
60 CPGR 6/95/7 Rev.1 FAO.
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deposited in genebanks since they typically form part of research
collections. Members might therefore choose to limit the scope of the
system to materials whose exchange is not already restricted in some
way. At a minimum, however, the scope might reasonably include all
material currently available for exchange.
 
 Scope Defined by Date of Collection (pre- or post-CBD)
14. Material collected or obtained prior to the entry into force of the
Convention on Biological Diversity (29 December 199361) is not covered
by its provisions on access and benefit-sharing.62 Consequently, this
date could serve as a point of reference for determining scope. For
example, MUSE might include only pre-CBD materials as a means to
resolve the outstanding question of access to ex situ collections not
acquired in accordance with the Convention.63 Alternatively, MUSE
might include only post-CBD materials, so that the system would be in
full conformity with the Convention. This would leave pre-CBD
materials outside the scope of MUSE (including the bulk of collections
held ex situ) and subject to exchange as at present.
 
15. A third option might be to include both pre- and post-CBD materials in
the scope of MUSE. From a purely practical standpoint, this option has
certain advantages. The necessity to treat material collected before the
coming into force of the Convention differently from that collected after
would impose significant practical difficulties on ex situ genebanks.
Added costs would be incurred in monitoring origins and in dispatching
samples under different terms and conditions based on the time of
acquisition.
 
16. In addition, copies of the same gene are likely to be found in accessions
acquired both before and after 29 December 1993. It would be
impossible to prove that a gene had been obtained from material
collected pre-CBD, and thus did not give rise to need to share benefits,
or from post-CBD material, and did.
 
17. Arbitration of conflicts over breeding materials composed of both pre-
and post-CBD accessions could prove difficult as well, since breeding is
a step-by-step process that incorporates new genes in previously
                                                     
61 The Convention entered into force upon ratification by the 30th signatory, Mongolia. It only
enters into force in other countries subsequently on the date upon which they ratify.
62 Article 15.3.
63 Nairobi Final Act of the Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on
Biological Diversity, Resolution 3.
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developed or existing genetic materials. Including both pre- and post-
CBD materials in MUSE would avoid these difficulties altogether.
 
 
 Scope Defined by Conservation Method (ex situ or in situ)
18. This option distinguishes between genetic resources held ex situ64 and in
situ65 as a means to determine the scope of the system.
 
19. In situ conservation is essential for several reasons. First, genetic
resources held in situ continue to evolve in response to changing
environmental conditions, making them extremely useful to plant
breeders. Material conserved ex situ normally maintains its genetic
makeup. Second, certain genetic resources – notably recalcitrant-seeded
and clonally propagated species – are currently difficult and expensive
to conserve ex situ. Even if it were possible, the financial and
institutional resources needed to conserve all of the genetic diversity of
such crop resources ex situ are simply not available.
 
20. Most of the genetic resources held in genebanks obtained their
characteristic properties while growing in situ, frequently as a result of
human intervention on farmers' fields. The fact that these materials have
been collected and conserved ex situ at some point in time would
therefore not appear to be a useful distinction. Indeed, genetic resources
do not generally proceed directly from in situ regimes into the hands of
end users but first pass through an ex situ genebank and plant breeding
programmes. The difficulty of proving a gene’s origin – discussed in the
section on pre-and post-CBD material above – would seem to apply in
this case as well.
 
21. While there appear to be few arguments in favour of excluding materials
from MUSE based on the method of their conservation, in practice it is
likely that more participants in MUSE would have control over ex situ
than over in situ resources. While local communities and indigenous
groups, which often control in situ resources, would be eligible to join
MUSE, they may choose not to do so (see Chapter III). Thus
“ownership” rather than conservation method per se would appear to be
the more important factor (see next section).
 
 
 Scope Defined by Ownership
                                                     
64 As seed, pollen, in vitro or in field genebanks.
65 On farm or in natural habitats.
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22. The Convention on Biological Diversity recognizes the sovereignty of
nations over the genetic resources found within their borders. Countries
differ in the manner in which they recognize ownership rights over
genetic resources by the individuals, groups or institutions that are the
actual holders or guardians of the material.
 
23. The ownership option defines the scope of the system according to the
type of institute that holds the material. Institutes fall into two broad
categories: public (under the direct control of government) and private
(representing a company, non-governmental organization, community
group, individual, or some other entity beyond the direct control of
government).
 
24. Publicly owned material:  Assuming national legislation is not to the
contrary, any government institution holding collections of genetic
resources should be able to make them available to the system for
exchange. Governmental membership in MUSE would imply that all
materials held by the government and included in the scope of MUSE
would be brought into the system. If so agreed, this could include in situ
resources under governmental control, for example in national parks.
 
25. Privately owned material:  A significant proportion of the genetic
diversity currently used in breeding activities is in private hands and
governments may choose to regard this as the property of the holding
institute. Likewise, governments may recognize ownership or other
rights of farmers and indigenous communities over the materials on
their lands or territories. A country’s membership in MUSE would not
guarantee that such material will be placed at the disposal of the system
since the permission of these private groups would be needed. Similarly,
member countries might not be willing or able to require private non-
members to share benefits arising from the use of material already in




 Scope Defined by Intended Use
26. Genetic resources frequently have multiple uses. For example, certain
food crops can also be used in industry or for medicinal purposes. The
guar or cluster bean (Cyamopsis tetragonolobus) is grown as a garden
vegetable on the Indian subcontinent but plays a number of other roles,
including medicinal. Several species of the yam (genus Dioscorea) are
used in medicines as well as for food. This is also the case for some trees,
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such as the coconut, which serves many purposes in addition to its use
as food.
 
27. Genetic resources might be included in MUSE for certain uses only, such
as breeding for food production. The designated use of the material
could be specified in the terms and conditions for germplasm access and
release. Standard PIC and MAT agreements (as defined in the MUSE
Agreement) would cover access to material for the agreed purposes only
and would note that any other use, for example pharmaceutical research
and development, would require renegotiation – on a bilateral basis –
possibly leading to different benefit-sharing obligations.
 
 
 Scope Defined by Mixed Options
28. MUSE members might choose to combine any of the above options in
determining the scope of the system. For example, the scope might be
defined not just by taxon, but also by intended use and nature of
ownership. Needless to say, combining a number of options will narrow
the scope of the system and might require more complex monitoring
systems.
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 Chapter V.  Conclusions and Next Steps
 Conclusions
1. This report describes three basic options for regulating access to plant
genetic resources for food and agriculture. It concludes that the first, a
strictly bilateral approach, is virtually unworkable with regard to
PGRFA. The second, the current informal multilateral approach, has
significant strengths; however, a lack of clarity with regard to the rights
and obligations associated with participation in the system has tended to
discourage the involvement of important stakeholders, in particular,
farmers and community groups. In addition, some countries are
concerned that the current approach does not meet the requirements of
the CBD with regard to its provisions for access and benefit-sharing.
 
2. The third option – MUSE – retains the essential elements of the current
approach within the framework of a system guided by a set of mutually
agreed rules. Within this framework, MUSE could accommodate a broad
range of alternatives existing between the extremes of purely bilateral
and informal multilateral approaches to exchange. Possible scenarios
within the MUSE option are presented; these include the establishment
of a fund and/or mechanisms allowing the bilateral negotiation and
sharing of benefits under certain prescribed circumstances. A
combination of these scenarios might coexist within the basic MUSE
framework and be applied according to circumstances.
 
3. The report notes that there are significant advantages to be gained from
the broadest possible participation in MUSE and it explores various
means whereby countries and a wide range of institutions – from both
member and non-member countries – could participate as full partners
in the system.
 
4. The major benefits to be derived from MUSE – for both providers and
recipients of germplasm – are described, as are mechanisms by which
these benefits could be shared. The report explains the desirability of
using standard terms for obtaining prior informed consent, and of
reaching mutual agreement on standard terms for access.
 
5. Finally, institutional issues are addressed. The guiding principles for the
system would be set by the Convention on Biological Diversity. The
MUSE Agreement, comprising membership rules and describing the
scope of the system, would be determined by governments. The
governance and monitoring of MUSE, including responsibility for
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revising the MUSE rules to meet changing needs, would rest with
government members. Conditions for non-government membership
would be set by the host country of the participating institute or
organization and the report describes a number of ways in which such
groups might sign onto the system. Once they have joined MUSE, non-
government members would be subject to the same basic rules
regulating access and benefit-sharing as are contained in the MUSE
Agreement.
 
6. At the implementation level of MUSE, a wide variety of networking and
other partnership arrangements would be possible. Each of these
arrangements would be regulated by procedures appropriate to the
needs and circumstances of the parties and genepools concerned, but
they would in every case conform to the broad terms and conditions of
the MUSE rules. Existing crop and regional networks, as well as other
existing and new partnership arrangements, could all be accommodated
within the MUSE framework.
 
7. To be acceptable, any system for regulating access to PGRFA must be
consistent with the Convention on Biological Diversity. To be effective, it
must be flexible and cost-efficient. The three basic options presented in
the report are all consistent with the CBD. However, they vary in terms
of their flexibility and cost-effectiveness. As we have seen, although
individual bilateral arrangements are easily adaptable and generally
have low transaction costs, an exchange system based on bilateral
arrangements alone would be cumbersome in the extreme. The current
multilateral approach to exchange is highly cost-effective in that it
allows for the pooling of resources, technologies and talent. Its flexibility
is far greater than that which would be possible under a system
involving purely bilateral arrangements. However, it is less effective
than it might be, owing to the fact that uncertainties and practices with
regard to access and benefit-sharing deter potential participants from
making their genetic resources available and from collaborating in
international efforts to exchange germplasm, information and
technology. This points to the need for change in the current system.
8. MUSE endeavours to combine the advantages of the various
approaches. It describes an open and transparent system in which the
rights and obligations of all members would be clearly specified and
protected by the system. The basic MUSE option is likely to be at least as
cost-effective as the current multilateral approach, and for the same
reasons. The imposition of a simple structural framework on the system
might even result in further cost savings, by for example, eliminating the
need to prepare MTAs to cover individual transactions and the pooling
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of resources to meet the costs of conservation, technology transfer and
capacity-building. The transaction costs of some of the MUSE scenarios
need further study before their cost-effectiveness is fully known (see
Next Steps below). However, allowing a combination of the MUSE
scenarios to coexist within the basic system framework and applying
them according to circumstances (e.g. according to the particular
genepool concerned) could result in an exchange system that is both




9. If it is agreed that the basic MUSE option, and/or any of its scenarios,
are worth pursuing, a number of issues will need further study. For
example:
 
10. l  The Study Team was only able to provide a qualitative assessment of
the benefits accruing from the current system. The benefits available to
the system might well increase under the MUSE option. However, in
order to evaluate the potential of MUSE to improve upon the current
system, it will be important to undertake studies to evaluate needs and
to determine in more detail the kinds of benefits desired by various
groups of providers (local communities, national genebanks,
governments, etc.).
 
11. l  The MUSE scenario allowing bilateral benefit-sharing would require
guidelines for negotiations on profit-sharing, and for establishing
maximum levels of potential benefits/liabilities for different
circumstances. Further research would be needed before such guidelines
could be developed.
 
12. l  In addition, it will be necessary to study in detail the transaction costs
– such as initial and continuing investments in human resources and
equipment – for a range of activities. These include recording and
monitoring releases, drafting, negotiating and implementing MTAs or
other transfer mechanisms, tracking and monitoring the use of
materials, and enforcement of agreements, which may entail litigation.
The Study Team was unable to conduct such an analysis due to the lack
of relevant data at the national and institutional levels. Such information
will be required to assess these costs and take the analysis further.
 
13. l  Further study would be needed on issues such as the governance of
MUSE and associated bodies, the implications of MUSE for national
legislation, the form and legal feasibility of material transfer
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arrangements such as the MTAs described in Annex IV, and possible
formats for standardizing terms and procedures for obtaining prior
informed consent and mutual agreement on terms of access.
 
14. The future development of sustainable agricultural systems world-wide
requires that plant genetic resources for food and agriculture remain
accessible, and are available under terms and conditions that ensure that
the benefits arising from their use are shared fairly and equitably. To
this end, it is hoped that the options considered in this report will make
a useful contribution to the ongoing debate.
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 Annex I.
 STATEMENT TO THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON
PLANT GENETIC  RESOURCES, BY DR. G. HAWTIN,
DIRECTOR GENERAL, INTERNATIONAL PLANT GENETIC
RESOURCES INSTITUTE (IPGRI), 28 JUNE 1995, ON
APPROACHES TO FACILITATING ACCESS TO PLANT
GENETIC RESOURCES AND PROMOTING THE EQUITABLE
SHARING OF BENEFITS ARISING FROM THEIR COMMERCIAL
EXPLOITATION, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE CGIAR.
 
1. During its Sixth Session, the Commission on Plant Genetic Resources
invited the Director General of IPGRI to outline the CGIAR’s perception
of the interlinked technical and policy problems it faced in managing the
ex situ collections held in trust by the Centres, which they had now
brought into the Network under the auspices of FAO. The Commission
believed that the information he had given verbally was of value for its
work, and requested him to prepare for its consideration a note
containing this information. The present note responds to that request,
and outlines some of the ideas under discussion within the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) concerning the
possible development of a multilateral framework for plant genetic
resources, its implications for the germplasm collections held in trust by
the Centres of the CGIAR, and its possible application to a wider
agreement on terms of access.
 
 Background
2. With the coming into force of the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD), the Centres of the CGIAR have been giving attention to how they
might operate in the future to meet the terms and conditions of the
Convention, particularly with respect to ownership, access on mutually
agreed terms, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the
commercial exploitation of plant genetic resources. In the pre-Convention
period, the Centres collectively have assembled what is probably the
world’s largest ex situ collection of genetic resources of food and fodder
crops of importance to developing-country agriculture. These collections
have been assembled with the full participation and knowledge of the
countries (primarily developing countries) providing the germplasm, that
the materials would be made available to the world community. In October
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1994 the Centres signed agreements with FAO bringing the collections
under the auspices of FAO. In these agreements the Centres undertake to
make the germplasm and information on it available to users, and agree
not to take out intellectual property protection on the materials and to
ensure that recipients of samples are bound by the same obligation.
 
3. The agreements only cover the existing collections, i.e. collections that were
assembled prior to the coming into force of the CBD. It is of particular
concern to the Centres and to their partners, particularly the National
Agricultural Research Systems (NARS) in developing countries, that
agreement be reached quickly on future arrangements to ensure continued
and easy access to plant germplasm, at low transaction cost, under the
terms of the CBD. The CGIAR regards plant genetic resources to be of
fundamental importance as a resource for development. While their
conservation is essential for the future, it is even more important to ensure
that they are available for use today, by farmers, plant breeders and others
who would seek to use them as a basis for sustainable agricultural
development.
 
 The general approach
4. In order to promote the continued availability of PGRFA under the terms
of the CBD, it is proposed that a system be developed, within a multilateral
framework, which would both respect the principle of access on mutually
agreed terms, although these would be multilaterally agreed, and provide
mechanisms for the sharing of benefits. Countries would agree to place
their PGRFA into such a system based on Prior Informed Consent, and
access to samples of these resources would be ‘unrestricted’ (unpaid, at
point of access, but regulated through a legal mechanism such as a material
transfer agreement) for all other countries which are parties to the system.
Such ‘unrestricted’ access would be limited to those countries.
 
5. All PGRFA in the system could be used, without payment, for research and
for not-for-profit purposes. However, in cases where profits are generated
through the commercial exploitation of the resources, there would be an
obligation on users of samples of PGRFA to negotiate a share of the profits
with countries of origin for material collected after the entry into force of
the CBD. The definitions of ‘not-for-profit use’ and ‘commercial use’ would
need to be agreed.
 
6. Material obtained prior to the coming into force of the Convention would
either continue to be distributed on the present basis, or on the condition
that any benefits derived from commercial use could be put into the
envisaged international fund for the implementation of Farmers' Rights. In
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the latter case, this could be limited only to material where the country of
origin is unknown.
 
7. All participating countries (but with special emphasis on developing
countries) would be eligible for support from an international funding
mechanism, in order to promote conservation and utilization of PGRFA, as
elaborated in the Global Plan of Action, once it is adopted. Developed-
country parties to the system would contribute financially to the funding
mechanism, in addition to making their own PGRFA available.
 
8. Countries placing their material into the system would get several types of
benefits:
∗ access to technologies of use in agricultural development, including
improved materials and biotechnologies, particularly through the
involvement of international organizations in the system.
∗ access to other countries’ PGRFA as well as other benefits from the
multilateral system,
∗ access to funds and other support through the Global System, and
∗ shares of profits derived from particular samples of PGRFA, in cases
where country of origin is known and the product is commercialized.
 
 Some comments and observations
9. Access to PGRFA in the system would essentially be ‘unrestricted’ for
research and not-for-profit use. However, it would be regulated in line
with the provisions in the CBD for Prior Informed Consent (PIC) and
access on mutually agreed terms. This requirement might be implemented
through a material transfer agreement or other appropriate legal
mechanisms (e.g. it might be possible to negotiate ‘umbrella’ country
agreements) to ensure that benefits can be shared on a fair and equitable
basis in cases where research leads to commercialization.
 
10. As noted, the definition of ‘not-for-profit use’ and ‘commercial use’ need to
be agreed. For example, ‘not-for-profit use’ might include farmer-to-farmer
exchanges, and varieties bred by public institutions which are made
available without profit. ‘Commercial use’ might include all cases where
profits are involved, or might be limited to cases where IPR protection is
employed. Enforcement in the latter case might be easier.
 
11. It might be necessary to have a minimum ‘cut-off’ point, in terms of the
contribution of material from a specific accession to a commercial variety,
for sharing benefits. It might not be worthwhile, for example, negotiating
with multiple countries of origin the sharing of benefits from a relatively
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unprofitable new variety with a complex pedigree. In any case, the
international community will have to weigh the transaction costs against
the possible benefits. In such cases it might be better for a share of profits to
be paid according to a standard formula in line with internationally agreed
guidelines, or into the proposed international fund. In other cases, for
example when a single sample contributes a characteristic of major
significance (such as resistance to an important disease), the share of
benefits awarded to a country of origin might exceed that normally granted
purely on the basis of the theoretical overall percentage contribution of
genes to the genome.
 
12. Clearly negotiations on the equitable sharing of benefits are likely to be
very complex and recipients of germplasm are likely to want to know their
potential liability in advance of conducting any expensive research. It will
thus be important to establish internationally accepted guidelines for such
negotiations on benefit-sharing that are as simple as possible, and
reasonable in terms of the benefits that may result. In addition,
consideration should be given to the provision of legal assistance to
countries with a limited capacity in this regard.
 
13. For the particular case of materials obtained prior to the coming into force
of the CBD there are several options:
 
14. l  the materials would continue to be distributed and used freely, subject
only to the provisions of the agreements with FAO concerning IPRs, i.e.
that the holders of international collections would not take out any IPRs on
the germplasm and would pass this obligation on to any recipients of the
material;
15. l  in cases of commercialization, the users of the germplasm could
negotiate, within the framework of the Global System, with the holder of
an international collection for sharing profits, with the proceeds going into
the international fund;
16. l  in cases where the country of origin is known, a similar arrangement
could be put in place so that the country of origin would negotiate a share
of profits.
 
17. With respect to sharing financial benefits, the proposed multilateral system
would increase the probability of materials placed in the system being
used, and therefore of benefits being realized and shared, owing to their
wider availability for screening and evaluation. However, in most cases
such financial benefits are unlikely to be large, which again underlines the
importance of analyzing the transaction costs involved. Other advantages
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accruing to countries participating in the proposed multilateral system
include:
∗ access to information on the performance and characteristics of the
germplasm they have placed in the system;
∗ added security of PGRFA, through duplication and through its wider
dissemination;
∗ access to improved materials developed through the use, for non-profit
purposes, of material placed in the system;
∗ access to opportunities for capacity-building, e.g. provision of facilities
and training.
 
18. A fundamental decision would be required as to the species coverage of
any multilateral agreement of the type presented here. Should it cover all
PGRFA, all food crop genepools, or just crops of critical importance for
food security? Should there be list of all the taxa to be included, or would it
be better to include all PGRFA and agree on certain exclusions? Given the
scope for bilateral negotiations on the sharing of benefits within the
proposed system, it would seem desirable for the system to be as inclusive
as possible. Indeed, there would be strong incentives to join a well-
designed system. As a minimum, however, the system could make a start
based on the commodity genepools covered by the CGIAR. However,
thought needs to be given to situations where it would be agreed to
exclude a particular taxon, and to the possibility, and the consequences, of
a country opting out of the system for certain taxa but participating with
respect to others.
 
19. Developed countries which are not particularly rich in PGRFA and are
thus heavily dependent on PGRFA from outside their borders, would
still have full access to genetic resources under the proposed system. A
fully bilateral system with restrictions at point of access risks leaving
them with few opportunities to access the resources they need.
 
20. The effectiveness of any system, whether multilateral or bilateral, would
depend to a considerable extent on mutual goodwill, and the willingness of
all the participating countries to make it work, recognizing that a fully
effective and equitable system is in the best interests of all. Appropriate
legal instruments, whether material transfer agreements or other
mechanisms, would need to be developed. Other possibilities for helping
to ensure compliance could also be explored, e.g. it might be possible to
include in IPR legislation the requirement to disclose the origin of
component genetic resources in all IPR applications. Good documentation
systems would also assist in the monitoring of the movement of materials
and thus help to minimize infringements.
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 Conclusion
21. In conclusion, the CGIAR regards it as a high priority that agreement be
reached on an effective multilateral framework for PGRFA. Such a system
should help ensure efficient conservation, promote access and use, and
ensure an equitable sharing of any benefits arising from the commercial
exploitation of PGRFA. It should conform to both the letter and the spirit of
the CBD and should aim to minimize transaction costs while maximizing
efficiency and effectiveness. Although many details remain to be resolved,
a system such as the one outlined here would meet such criteria, if
developed and shaped by the international community, working together.
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 Annex II.
 Terms of Reference for and Composition of the IPGRI
Multilateral Study Team and Task Force
 
1. The sixth session of the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture (FAO-CPGRFA) held in Rome 19-30 June 1995,
requested that IPGRI prepare an in-depth study, for its consideration in
April 1996, of the various possible multilateral systems compatible with
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), analyzed in terms of
practicality, efficiency and cost-effectiveness. To comply with this
request, IPGRI established a team of four consultants: Mr. Wolfgang
Siebeck (Germany), Dr. Marcio de Miranda Santos (Brazil), Dr. Graham
Jenkins (UK) and Ms Kerry ten Kate (UK) with the required legal and
technical skills to conduct such a study. The work of the team was
supported by an IPGRI Task Force made up of senior IPGRI staff: Ms.
Ruth Raymond, Dr. Jan Engels, Dr. Dick van Sloten, Dr. Emile Frison
and Dr. George Ayad (Chair) and included two observers from FAO: Dr.
Jose Esquinas-Alcazar and Mr. Gerald Moore. Based upon the findings
contained in this study, IPGRI plans to submit a report to the FAO-
CGRFA in April 1996.
 
 Terms of Reference
2. Under the general supervision of the Director General and the direct
supervision of the chairman of the IPGRI Task Force on the multilateral
study, the Study Team members will:
 
3. l  submit, to IPGRI, an in-depth factual study on the various possible
technical options, including the establishment of international fund, and
their legal implications for a multilateral system that would facilitate
access to genetic resources for food and agriculture on mutually agreed
terms while offering ways and means of equitable and fair sharing of
benefits arising from the use of these genetic resources in commercial
and /or non-commercial purposes to developing countries (countries of
origin) differentiating if necessary between developed and developing
countries.
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4. Components of such a study may include:
• Introduction: bilateral as compared to multilateral approaches: nature
and pros and cons of each within the context of national and
international legislation/treaties and practices, why a multilateral
system is needed.
• Multilateral approaches including the following elements:
• Scope: Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGRFA),
designate some species? (criteria of selection, industrial crops,
pharmaceutical species, forest tree species, etc., case of multiple uses
of many species), designate all species?, etc.
• Membership and governance of a multilateral system: governmental
institutions, UN organizations, non-governmental institutions
including the private sector; governance system of the multilateral
system.
• Modalities of sharing benefits: cut-off point (i.e. patented material,
IPR-protected material?)
• Distinction between commercial and non-commercial uses.
• Distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural uses.
• Which benefits to share?
• How to share different types of benefits?
• Funding mechanisms: for instance an international fund–who
donates funds?; nature of fund–obligatory, voluntary, taxes on seed
sales; how should funds be used, e.g. direct support to genebanks, to
breeding programmes; capacity-building including the transfer of
technology; other funding mechanisms; governance of the various
funding mechanisms.
• Role of IPGRI and the CGIAR.
• Role of the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture (FAO-CPGRFA) and the International Technical
Conference on Plant Genetic Resources.
• FAO/CGIAR Centres agreements. How will the multilateral system
impact upon the agreements signed for the designated germplasm
and for the next four years and on potential agreements?
 
5. Utilize as basic sources of information for the study such documents as:
The FAO Undertaking for Plant Genetic Resources, The Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD), IPGRI’s paper to the Sixth Session of the
FAO-CPGR (28 June 1995); IPGRI Issues in Genetic Resources No. 2, by
D. Cooper et al., 1994, The SAREC consultation on multilateral systems
(Stockholm, May 1995) and IPGRI Issues in Genetic Resources No. 1, by
Barton and Siebeck, May 1994.
 
ACCESS TO PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES – THE MUSE STUDY 73
INTERNATIONAL PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES INSTITUTE
6. In the initial phase, submit for IPGRI’s approval a workplan for the
Study Team’s activities including the brainstorming consultation and
travel with a view to composing a first draft of the study in late
November/early December 1995 and final IPGRI-approved version in
January 1996.
 
7. To consult with, through visits, contacts and attendance of relevant
meetings, as wide a range of national programmes, NGOs, the private
sector, international organizations such as UPOV, WIPO, The FAO-
CGRFA and the CBD secretariats, CGIAR and non-CGIAR Centres, as
possible in the course of synthesizing the various options contained in
the study so as to reflect actual examples. Relevant meetings would
include some of the subregional meetings of the FAO International
Technical Conference.
 
8. To fully document in the study all sources of various forms of
information reported for each option and the basis for the legal
implication of these options, e.g. figures, data in catalogues and tables,
statistics, public and non-public institutional reports, etc.
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Annex III.
Informal Consultation Process Undertaken by the Study
Team
Date and venue Institutions visited / Meetings attended and
persons met
I. Consultations held at
IPGRI and FAO, Rome,
Italy
6 September 1995, IPGRI
7 September 1995, FAO
12 September 1995, FAO
6-12 September 1995, IPGRI
Mr. Roger Smith, Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew,
UK
Dr. Jose Esquinas-Alcazar, Executive Secretary,
The FAO Commission on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture (FAO-
CPGRFA)
Dr. David Cooper, FAO/ ICPPGR
Messrs. Gerald Moore, Legal Counsel, FAO;
Luis Bompin, Legal Office, FAO
Dr. Cary Fowler, Project Manager, FAO/
International Conference and Programme on
Plant Genetic Resources (ICPPGR)
IPGRI steering committee members and other
IPGRI senior staff
II. Consultations held in
Nitra, Slovakia
24-26 September 1995 The European Regional meeting of ICPPGR
attended by country representatives
III. Consultations held in
the UK
10 October 1995, The British
Society of Plant Breeders,
London, UK
Meeting with the Board of the British Society of
Plant Breeders
IV. Consultations held in
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Date and venue Institutions visited / Meetings attended and
persons met
Switzerland











18 October 1995, Union for
the Protection of Plant
Varieties (UPOV), Geneva
Dr. Calestous Juma, Executive Secretary,
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (SCBD), Dr. Arturo Martinez, Senior
Officer (Biological Resources), SCBD and Susan
Bragdon, Legal Officer, SCBD
Dr. Jeffrey McNeely, Chief Scientist
(Biodiversity), The World Conservation Union
(IUCN), Gland
Dr. Bernard Le Buanec, Secretary General,
Association Internationale des Seléctionneurs
(ASSINSEL), Nyon
Dr. Barry Greengrass, Deputy Secretary General,
UPOV
V. Consultations held in
Stockholm, Sweden
19 October 1995, The
Swedish International
Development Cooperation
Drs. Peter Hartelius, Swedish International
Development Agency (SIDA); Karen Gerhardt
(SAREC); Bo Bengtsson, The Swedish Academy
of Sciences; Carl-Gustaf Thornstrom, (SAREC);
and Ulf Svensson (Ministry of Agriculture)
VI. Consultations held in
Washington DC, USA
23 October 1995, The
CGIAR Secretariat, The
World Bank
24 October 1995, The
CGIAR Secretariat
Presentation to the CGIAR Genetic Resources
Policy Committee chaired by Dr. M.S.
Swaminathan
Meeting with Dr. Don Duvick, Iowa State
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Meeting with Mr. Pat Roy Mooney, Executive
Director, Rural Advancement Foundation
International (RAFI)
Meeting with USDA staff, chaired by Dr. Henry
Shands
Informal meeting of CGIAR donors, sponsored
and arranged by Sweden (SIDA/SAREC)
during International Centers Week
VII. Consultations held in
the UK
30 October 1995, Ministry
of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries (MAFF), London
Mr. John Suich and Ms. Susan Buckingham,
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
(MAFF), London
VIII. Consultations held in
Jakarta, Indonesia 6-17
November, 1995 during the
Conference of the Parties
(COP) to the CBD
A. Informal meetings with government
delegations of the following countries in their
personal capacities:
Canada Dr. Brad Fraleigh
Brazil    Mr. Enio Cordeiro, Dr. Maria Jose
Amstalden Sampaio, Dr. Lidio Coradin
Spain    Mr. Santiago Castroveijo Bolivar
France   Dr. Michel Chauvet
UK        Mr. John Suich
Malaysia  Prof. Dr. Zakri A. Hamid
USA  Ms. Vanessa Laird, Dr. Robert Bertram,
Dr. John Mutuszack
India  Dr. Gidda Venkata Sarat Babu
Argentina  Ms. Monica Liliana Araujo
Germany   Dr. Wilbert Himminghofen
Indonesia  Dr. Setijati Sastrapradja
Colombia  Mr. Fernando Casas
Ethiopia   Mr. Girma Hailu
Philippines Mr. Antonio La Vina
B. Meeting with representatives of NGOs:
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Date and venue Institutions visited / Meetings attended and
persons met
Mr. Paul I. Borja, CBDC-SEARICE, Philippines
Mr. Jake Tan, CADI, Philippines
Mr. Abet Gavino, SEARICE, Philippines
Mr. Witoon L., TREE, Thailand
Mr. Crissy Romeno, SEARICE, Philippines
Mr. Generoso Deal Cruz, CONSERVE,
Philippines
Mr. Neth Dant, SEARICE, Philippines
Mr. Arma Bertuso, SEARICE, Philippines
Mr. Frank Magnifico, CONSERVE, Philippines
Mr. Romeo Quijand, PAN PHILS/ University of
the Philippines College of Medicine, Philippines
Mr. Marcos Juing, BASDA, Sarawak, Malaysia
Dr. Walter Reid, World Resources Institute
(WRI), USA
Mr. Brendan Tobin, Sociedad Peruana de
Derechos Ambiental, Peru
Ms. Kritsada Boonchai, Local Development
Institute (LDI), Thailand
Ms. Janie Lasimbang, Partners of Community
Organizations , Sabah, Malaysia
Mr. Pat Roy Mooney, RAFI, Canada
Ms. Kerry ten Kate, Royal Botanic Gardens,
Kew, UK
Mr. Sam Johnston, University of Cambridge, UK
Mr. Nelson Alvarez, GRAIN, Spain
Ms. Gudrun Henne, German NGO Working
Group on Biodiversity, Germany
C. Presentations to and participation in
workshops:
“Intellectual Property Rights: Threat to
Biodiversity and Society”, 6 November
“Intellectual Property Rights and Access to
Genetic Resources: Follow-up to the Global
Biodiversity Forum”, 9 November
“Agrobiodiversity Workshop (Sweden):  The
IPGRI multilateral study, the FAO Leipzig
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Date and venue Institutions visited / Meetings attended and
persons met
Conference and issues for COP3”, 13 November
IX. Consultations on the
development of the report
The following provided comments on the draft
report:
Prof. Donald N. Duvick
Affiliate Professor of Plant Breeding
Dept. of Agronomy
Iowa State University
6837 N.W. Beaver Drive
P.O. Box 446
Johnston, Iowa  50131, USA
Dr. Stephen Smith
Pioneer HiBred Int., Inc.
P.O. Box 1004
7300 N.W. 62nd Ave.
Johnston, Iowa 50131, USA
Mr. John H. Barton
1240 Harwalt Drive
Los Altos, CA  94024, USA
Dr. Carl-Gustaf Thornstrom




Rural Advancement Foundation International
Suite 504, 71 Bank Street
Ottawa, Ontario KIP5N2, Canada
Mr. Henk Hobbelink
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Date and venue Institutions visited / Meetings attended and
persons met
Zeneca Seeds
Jealotts Hill Research Station
Warfield, Bracknell,























International Association of Plant Breeders
Chemin du Reposoir 7
CH-1260 Nyon, Switzerland
Mr. Carlos Correa
Universidad de Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Dr. R. S. Rana
Former Director NBPGR (India)
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Date and venue Institutions visited / Meetings attended and
persons met
D-43, Indraprastha Apts
Flat 1, Section 14, Rohini








7th floor, Sir John Carling Bldg.
Ottawa, Ontario KIA0G5, Canada
Dr. Jochen de Haas
Federal Ministry for Economic
Collaboration (BMZ)







X. Consultations with the
CGIAR/IARCs
1. The Inter-Center Working Group on Genetic
Resources (ICWG-GR), summary/draft
discussed in Lima, Peru, Januray 1996
2. The CGIAR Genetic Resources Policy
Committee, draft summary and full study
report circulated for discussion in February and
April 1996, respectively
ACCESS TO PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES – THE MUSE STUDY 81
INTERNATIONAL PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES INSTITUTE
 Annex IV.
 Provisions for Bilateral Benefit-Sharing within MUSE
 
 Trigger points for bilateral benefit-sharing
1. If it were decided to include a bilateral element in MUSE, negotiations
between a germplasm provider and recipient on benefit-sharing –
including whether or not to share benefits – could arise at various points as
a product is developed from the material. The earliest moment for
negotiation would be when the material was first sent to the user, and the
latest, when the product derived from the material was put on the market
and generated sales. Aspects of benefit-sharing such as joint participation
in research might most appropriately be negotiated early in the product
development cycle, whereas the sharing of any royalties arising from sales
of the final product could be finalized when it became apparent that the
product was likely to give rise to commercial profits. Between these two
extremes, negotiations might occur when the user has determined that the
material is interesting enough to warrant further research and
development, or when a user files for intellectual property protection.
 
2. The value of the germplasm provided may be assessed differently at the
various stages of product development. Initially, when little is known
about possible traits and the ultimate use of the material, the assessment of
benefits will be more difficult than later in the research and development
process when its value will become more apparent, albeit still difficult to
quantify. It may also become clear at this point that the material is not
useful, either because no product is developed, or because the final product




 Which events could trigger negotiations on benefit-sharing?
• User obtains material
• User introduces material into research/breeding programme
• Research determines useful traits in material
• User decides to develop product from material
• User files for intellectual property protection
• User starts field trials
• User brings product to market
• Sales start to generate financial benefits
 
 Difficulties associated with bilateral benefit-sharing
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3. Bilateral benefit-sharing arrangements will be subject to practical
difficulties and some costs. Negotiating an appropriate share of financial
benefits, for example, will require evaluating the contribution of the
provided germplasm to the market value of the new product. This is a
tremendously difficult and complex process (see below) and may, in
some cases, require protracted and costly arbitration.
 
 The challenge of calculating economic benefits
4. A market has developed for plants, microorganisms and animals as the
source of new pharmaceuticals, with a range of prices per sample and
royalties on sales. However, there is little experience of this form of
benefit-sharing in the agricultural field.
 
5. Crops differ from pharmaceutical products in a number of ways. The
global market for pharmaceuticals is some $235 billion per annum, to
which products derived from natural sources may contribute between
25% and 40%.66  By contrast, the global market for seeds is $15 billion.
Normally less than 20% of the germplasm used for plant breeding is
obtained from newly introduced landraces and wild species. The
balance comes from commercially available material.67
 
6. A naturally derived pharmaceutical will typically be based on an active
compound discovered in a single sample. The probability of an
individual sample becoming a marketed medicine is around 1 in
10 000.68  The probability that a single accession used in a breeding
                                                     
66 ten Kate, K. 1995, Biopiracy or green petroleum? Expectations and Best Practice in
Bioprospecting. Overseas Development Administration, London.
67 In a survey of the source of germplasm for various crop groups for 20 plant breeding and seed
companies (Cambridge and WCMC, 1994), the companies surveyed obtained 81.5% of all their
germplasm from commercial cultivars, compared with 1% from wild species maintained in
situ, 1.4% from in situ landraces, 2.5% from wild species held in ex situ genebanks, and 1.6%
from landraces maintained in genebanks (Cambridge University Faculty of Economics and
Politics and the World Conservation Monitoring Centre, draft, June 1994, Sustainable
Utilisation for Global, National and Community Benefit: an Analysis of Utilisation and
Biodiversity Conservation. Case Study:  the Use of Plant Genetic Resources in Agriculture).
68 1 in 10 000 samples is likely to result in a marketable drug. This figure needs some qualification.
The ratio of 1:10,000 is much cited for the probability of identifying a ’lead’ from a pure
chemical compound, rather than from a sample or extract from a higher plant, microorganism,
etc. Perhaps one in four ’leads’ may result in marketable products. At a 1986 OECD workshop,
participants including representatives from pharmaceutical companies agreed that the
probability that any given plant would produce a marketable prescription drug ranged
between 1:1000 and 1:10 000, given that each plant contains many compounds to be screened
(Principe 1991). Between 1:50 000 and 1:1 000 000 tests (i.e. combinations of different extracts
against different screens) are estimated to result in viable commercial (ten Kate, K. 1995,
Biopiracy or Green Petroleum? Expectations and Best Practice in Bioprospecting. Overseas
Development Administration, London. 1995).
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programme will ultimately contribute to a new crop line is much higher,
but the new crop line will not be derived from a single accession. Rather,
it will have a complex pedigree to which large numbers of cultivated
varieties and wild species have contributed.
 
7. To add to the complications, it may be impossible to determine which
lines have interbred with those under investigation, and which, of the
many parents involved, have contributed valuable traits to the genome
of the final ‘new’ variety. Even if the genes contributing useful
characteristics were to be identified, and their source known, calculating
the economic value of their contribution would be virtually impossible.
Is a single gene that offers disease resistance – perhaps one in 10 000
genes in the plant as a whole – worth only 1/10000 of the plant’s value?
 
8. The concept of ‘commercialization’ would itself need to be strictly
defined within the context of negotiations on benefit-sharing. Should it
refer to all sales or just the sale of seeds? Would it only cover those sales
intended to bring profit? What about sales made on a concessional basis
in a highly subsidized seed production and marketing situation, as is
often the case with government-bred varieties in developing countries?
What about situations where a new product is not sold but bartered for
goods and services?
 
9. Another significant issue needing resolution is the extent to which
benefit-sharing obligations would be transferred through a chain of
varieties. Would the obligation stop with the first release? Would it
thereafter be transferred to the breeder of the new variety? Or would
obligations to share benefits continue through successive varieties, with
the actual share of benefits decreasing as the original germplasm came
to constitute an ever decreasing proportion of the ancestry of the new
varieties produced?69
 
10. According to UPOV rules, released varieties can be used as parents of
new varieties bred by others without authorization from the original
breeder, providing the new variety differs sufficiently from the original
(the so-called Breeders’ Exemption).70 The principle of carry-over
                                                     
69 See Barton/Siebeck. 1994, p. 43.
70 According to the 1978 UPOV Convention, Article 15.3, “Authorization by the breeder shall not
be required either for the utilization of the variety as an initial source of variation for the
purpose of creating other varieties or for the marketing of such varieties. Such authorization
shall be required, however, when the repeated use of the variety is necessary for the
commercial production of another variety”. This provision was modified by the 1991 version of
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obligations, if accepted within the context of MUSE, would thus
introduce a new principle that is not required under UPOV rules.
 
11. One way to simplify matters might be for MUSE members to agree to
consider bilateral benefit-sharing only when a commercialized variety,
or a single gene or gene-construct derived from the introduced material,
comes under intellectual property protection. However, if such an
agreement were to include Plant Breeders’ Rights in addition to patents,
this would still not resolve the problem of the Breeders’ Exemption
addressed above. The simplest way around this would be to allow
bilateral benefit-sharing only in the event that a user were to take out a
patent on the product developed from the material. However, since
other forms of IPR (notably Plant Breeders’ Rights and Trade Secrets)
are commonly used by the seed industry, this approach would
considerably limit opportunities for the sharing of benefits.
 
12. The difficulties involved in evaluating benefits fairly late in product
development raise another potential problem. Companies might not
support a requirement to negotiate benefit-sharing late in the research
and development process (e.g. after a patent has been applied for) if this
would offer providers the chance to withhold their ultimate consent to
commercialization, thus jeopardizing the investments already made.
One option would be to determine a range of minimum and maximum
levels of benefits – binding on all MUSE members – which would apply
if provider and user were unable to reach an alternative agreement.
 
Monitoring
13. The simplest solution to the question of monitoring might be to require
users to initiate negotiations on benefit-sharing under the terms of the
MUSE Agreement. However, providers would still need to monitor the
use of their genetic resources as a means to identify infringements and
thus to enforce the terms of release. While monitoring use is not an easy
task, and may ultimately be impossible in many situations, there are
ways in which it can be facilitated. A number of possible tools are
discussed below.
 
14. Logging releases when material leaves a genebank would be a useful
means of tracking initial use. The log would include a description of the
material, the date, and the identity of the recipient. However, transfers
to subsequent users would not be recorded unless requested in advance,
and given the large number of samples distributed, and the frequency
                                                                                                                                               
the Convention which states that a new variety must differ significantly from a variety covered
by Plant Breeders’ Rights in order not to require the authorization of the original breeder.
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with which material changes hands, there is a considerable risk that
such a request would often be overlooked or ignored.
 
15. Another possible tool for monitoring use involves the application of
molecular and chemical techniques such as genetic fingerprinting. Their
use would facilitate the comparison of genetic materials and could allow
providers to determine with a reasonably high degree of probability
whether suspected products were derived from material originating
with them. However, these techniques need further development before
they can be used routinely and, at least at present, they are inordinately
costly to use on a routine basis.71
 
16. A third option would be to introduce regulations requiring that all
applicants filing for a patent or plant variety right identify the provider
of genetic material from which a patent was derived or a variety
developed.72 In most countries, this would not require a change of
patent or variety laws. By searching patent and plant variety databases,
providers would be able to learn where and how their material had been
used.
 
17. Identical genes may be found in more than one source and given the
small size of individual germplasm samples needed, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to monitor the origin and use of the full range of material
used in crop improvement programmes. For these reasons, any system
for monitoring the use of genetic resources will inevitably have to rely to
a large degree upon the methodical records and honesty of breeders.
 
Transaction costs
18. There are three stages at which transaction costs might be incurred.
First, agreements need to be put in place, such as MTAs or other legal
instruments which oblige users to share benefits, combined with a
requirement to disclose the origin of genetic material. Within MUSE,
these agreements could be standardized under the Agreement and so
                                                     
71 IPGRI Workshop on Conservation of PGRFA and the Use of Molecular Methods, 9-11 October
1995 (in press).
72  Tobin and Kothari propose that patent and variety offices require evidence of prior informed
consent as part of the filing for and granting of the relevant right. See Tobin, Brendan (1995)
"Ensuring Prior Informed Consent - the Need for a Multilateral Approach". Paper presented at
workshop on regulating access to genetic resources, the Global Biodiversity Forum, Hotel
Indonesia, Jakarta, 4-5. November, 1995. See also Kothari, Ashish (1995) "Equitable Access to
Biodiversity Resources and Benefits: Options for Action, and the Indian Follow-up". Paper
presented at workshop on regulating access to genetic resources, the Global Biodiversity
Forum, Hotel Indonesia, Jakarta, 4-5 November, 1995.
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would not entail considerable cost. Once the material has entered the
system, transfers within MUSE would be carried out under the terms of
the Agreement. Transfers by member recipients to non-member users
would be permitted, but these would require the new user to sign the
standard MTA and to abide by its terms. Multiple transfers of the
provided material would thus result in a ‘chain’ of MTAs with identical
terms and linking every subsequent user with the original provider.
 
19. A second stage would involve pursuing a claim by tracing the path
traveled by the material from the original provider to the final user. This
could well be expensive and require the search of databases and patent
registers.
 
20. Yet greater transaction costs would arise at a third stage when it comes
to the actual settling of a claim. This could involve expensive litigation
prompted because the chain of MTAs has collapsed and an intermediary
user has become liable for damages, or because the original provider
and the user disagree on the actual terms of benefit-sharing, or because
the user or intermediary has failed to abide by the terms of the MUSE
Agreement. As noted above, monitoring the origin and use of genetic
materials is very difficult and attempts to collect the evidence necessary
to substantiate a claim are likely to be quite costly.
 
 
 Legal assistance and negotiating guidelines for bilateral agreements
within MUSE
21. It might well be necessary for MUSE to adopt rules for bilateral
settlement procedures. These could include guidelines and procedures
for estimating the contribution of germplasm used in a new variety and
for establishing its value to the resulting variety. Rules for arbitration
should also be established. Consideration might be given to the
establishment of a system for legal assistance on which a developing
country could draw in pursuing bilateral benefit-sharing.
